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THE THIRD AMENDMENT: FORGOTTEN BUT NOT GONE
by Tom W. Bell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pity the Third Amendment.' The other amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion's Bill of Rights inspire public adoration and volumes of legal research. Meanwhile,
the Third Amendment languishes in comparative oblivion. The scant attention that it does
receive usually fails to serve it well. Lawyers twist it to fit absurd claims, the popular
press subjects it to ridicule, and academics relegate it to footnotes. Is this any way to treat
a member of the Bill of Rights?
A few scholars have, to their credit, recognized the important and dramatic role that
the Third Amendment and its predecessors played in British and American history.2 But
even these accounts overlook crucial aspects of the Third Amendment's story. The Third
Amendment has especially suffered from a lack of serious and sustained legal analysis.
3
This paper aims to fill the most glaring of these gaps in Third Amendment scholarship,
so as to round out our knowledge of the Bill of Rights and to give the Third Amendment
some respect long past due.
Part II of this paper examines the origins of the Third Amendment. Although this is
the one aspect of Third Amendment scholarship that has received a fair amount of
attention, a good deal remains to be said. Section A of Part II delves into the Third
Amendment's European roots, which arguably run deeper than those of any other protection
. B.A. (Honors) 1987, The University of Kansas; M.A. 1989, The University of Southern California; J.D.
Candidate 1993, The University of Chicago. The Humane Studies Foundation supported the author's work
on this paper through the grant of a Residential Fellowship, under which he spent the summer of 1991
researching and writing at the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University. An earlier version
of this paper received the University of Chicago Law School's Casper Platt award.
Prof. David P. Currie provided helpful guidance at all points of the paper's development. Prof. Jeremy
F. G. Shearmur, Prof. Stephen Davies, and Prof. David N. Mayer commented on versions of the paper
drafted while the author worked as a summer fellow. Prof. Richard H. Helmholz, Prof. B. Carmon Hardy,
Stephen P. Halbrook, and Edwin Olsen IV also furnished useful suggestions.
It reads: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
' Two articles address the history of the Third Amendment: William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The
Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 393 (1991); and B. Carmon Hardy, A Free People's Intolerable Grievance, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A
LIVELY HERITAGE 67 (1987). With regard to the second of these two papers, a nearly identical version
without footnotes was published earlier in 33 VIRGINIA CAVALCADE 126 (1984). Subsequent references to B.
Hardy in this paper refer to the later, footnoted version.
Each of the two law review articles that devote themselves solely to the Third Amendment treats it
almost entirely from an historical point of view. See William S. Fields, The Third Amendment: Constitution-
al Protection From the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 124 MIL. L. REV. 195 (1989); and Seymour W.
Wurfel, Quartering of Troops: The Unlitigated Third Amendment, 21 TENN. L. REV. 723 (1951).
3 The Third Amendment surfaces for a few paragraphs in Akhail R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L. J. 1131, 1174-75 (1991). A useful analysis of the only case interpreting the Third
Amendment appears in Ann Marie C. Petrey, Comment, The Third Amendment's Protection Against
Unwanted Military Intrusion: Engblom v. Carey, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 857 (1983). Litigation concerning
the Third Amendment gets a brief survey in Frank B. Lewis, Whatever Happened to the 3rd Amendment?,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1979, at 1.
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in the Bill of Rights. The account here traces the Third Amendment's pedigree back to
Anglo-Saxon customary law. The first written provisions against quartering, appearing in
town and borough charters throughout Europe, draw especially close scrutiny. The
relationship between purveyance and quartering also receives more careful treatment than
it has hitherto enjoyed. Section B in Part II concentrates on the Third Amendment's
American origins. It reveals that a mystery surrounds the Third Amendment's ratification:
why did Congress turn down James Madison's comprehensively worded amendment for
a version that fails to specify what limits apply to quartering at times when the country is
neither at peace nor officially at war?
Part III offers an answer to this mystery by examining the Third Amendment in
practice and theory. Section A uncovers evidence that U.S. troops were widely quartered
during the War of 1812 and the Civil War. While quartering during the forrner apparently
violated the Third Amendment, we can excuse quartering during the latter by reading the
Third Amendment in light of the theory that Congress turned down Madison's suggested
quartering amendment so as to give the Executive power to quarter troops during times
of civil unrest, military emergency, and rebellion. Section B in Part III discusses the few
cases where the Third Amendment has been used and, as is most often the case, abused.
Only the court in Engblom v. Carey4 took the amendment seriously. Section C examines
that case's effect on provisions against quartering in state constitutions. Lastly, Section
D analyzes quartering as a form of taking subject to the Fifth Amendment.
II. ORIGINS OF THE THIRD AMENDMENT
A. European Roots
Protections against forced billeting appear to be a uniquely British invention, well-
rooted in Anglo-Saxon law. Their first recorded use appears in the charter granted to
London by Henry I in 1131, and they subsequently spread to town and borough charters
throughout Great Britain. Although a few continental charters provided similar restrictions
on quartering, they did so only after the grant of London's charter and apparently due to
its influence. Initially, charter provisions about billeting appear to have been directed
mainly against the purveyance (forced leasing) of lodging for the royal household. In time,
however, concerns about the billeting of soldiers moved to the fore.
1. Home and Sword in Early English Law
English law has traditionally held the rights of homeowners in high regard. The early
Anglo-Saxon legal system placed concern for the household before nearly all else. It took
the point of view that "[a] 'breach of the peace' in itself means nothing, for there is no
general peace of the community, but only the thousands of islands of peace which
surround the roof-tree of every householder, noble and simple.... The frith, or peace,
over each home was protected by penalties for its breach. Trespassers paid for having
invaded the household enclosure, and those who committed offenses against persons
within a home's mund (protection) faced fines in excess of those otherwise levied. 6
4 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
JOHN E. A. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 8 (1961) (footnote
omitted).
6 Id. at 12. See also HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 56 (1983).
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Homeowners never faced a severe threat from the quartering of soldiers in Anglo-
Saxon times because there was no standing army as such. Instead, defense was provided
by the fyrd, a militia to which all able-bodied men owed service. Those who were called
up served locally for short durations and provided their own provisions. Professional
soldiers were limited to the small contingents maintained by kings and earls at great
expense. Only after the Norman Conquest in 1066 did quartering become a noticeable
problem. The newly introduced feudal system ensured that William would have a regular
supply of knights.7 Scutage, introduced in 1156 by Henry II, provided kings with revenue
for hiring professional soldiers.8 "It was in the centralization of Norman rule, the
militarization of the country, the abuse of the Saxon inhabitants, and the involvement in
continental wars that the grievance against the involuntary quartering of soldiers first took
root.' 9
2. British Town and Borough Charters
Legal protections against the forced billeting first appeared in the charters of English
towns and boroughs, beginning with the charter that Henry I granted to London in
1131.10 The charter stated that "within the walls of the city no one is to be billeted;
neither for one of my household nor for one of any other is lodging to be exacted by
force."" Subsequent London charters reiterated this right.'
2
The right to be free of quartering subsequently spread from London to boroughs
throughout England, Ireland, and Scotland. Oxford acquired the right by implication when
it was granted the same liberties enjoyed in London.' 3 The charters of Bedford and Lynn
then won Oxford's liberties, so that protections against quartering came to them twice
removed from their London origins. 14 Many other boroughs secured freedom from forced
billeting independently of London's charter, though no doubt due to its influence. 5 As
was the case with London, these charters sometimes served as models for other boroughs'
Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 395-96; Fields, supra note 2, at 196 n.4.
WILLIAM STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 454 (8th ed. 1900). See also Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 397.
Fields, supra note 2, at 196 n.4. See also Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 397-99.
"Et infra muros civitatis nullus hospitetur, neque de mea familia neque de alia, nisi alicui hospitium
liberetur." STUBBS, supra note 8, at 108.
" This translation comes from I SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 62 (Carl Stephenson
& Frederick Q. Marcham rev. ed., 1972).
12 Henry II made the protection explicit in the charter he granted to London in 1155, as did Richard I,
John, and Henry III in their charters. Later kings merely reaffirmed all previously granted rights. WILLIAM
STEPHENSON, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS, RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND PRIVILEGES, OF THE CITY OF LONDON 10-
30 (1765).
13 Charter of Henry 11 to Oxford (1155-1162), reprinted in ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 972-73
(David C. Douglas & George W. Greenway eds., 1968).
"4 BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, at cviii (Adolphus Ballard ed., 1913). See also, infra note
17 (a nonexclusive reference to Oxford in Portsmouth's charters of 1194 and 1201).
'5 Ballard finds 13 references to billeting in the charters of 10 boroughs (including another of Lynn's
three charters). BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, supra note 14, at 86-87. Though he recognizes a
reference to billeting in Norwich's 1189 charter, Ballard reads Norwich's 1199 charter differently. This later
charter read "Nemo hospitetur nec quid per vim capiat infra burgum de Norwico." Id. at 87. Ballard takes
this to say that "None shall be entertained nor take anything by force in the city of Norwich." Id. He
interprets Ipswich's 1200 charter similarly. Id, But Ballard's use of "entertained" for "hospitetur" suggests
that royal officers forced citizens to amuse the king. Other scholars thus prefer to read "hospitetur" as
"lodged" in this context. See the translations of Norwich's 1199 charter in Hardy, supra note 2, at 68; and
of Ipswich's charter in 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 11, at 96.
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charters.' 6 Still other boroughs won protection from billeting when the king promised
them liberties as good as those enjoyed by some general class of boroughs. 7 Summing
these up gives thirty-three occurrences of legal protections against forced billeting in
twenty-two British cities and boroughs during the period from 1131 to 1208."8
These protections were confirmed in 1215, when the Magna Carta stipulated that
"London shall have all its ancient liberties and free customs. Besides we will and grant
that all the other cities, boroughs, and ports shall have all their liberties and free
customs."' 9 This was no mere boilerplate. Those who enjoyed legal immunity from
forced billeting enforced their rights with great vigor and were given surprising leeway
to do so. If a homeowner killed an unwelcome guest while attempting to turn him out,
London's laws in the early 1300s allowed the unwilling host to "clear himself, by the
oath of any six, that he slew him for such cause."
21
3. Charters Outside of Britain
Were guarantees against forced billeting unique to Britain? No, but they appeared
elsewhere only rarely, and then due arguably only to Britain's influence. An extensive
comparison between British borough charters and their contemporary counterparts in
France, Germany, Spain, and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem uncovers provisions against
forced billeting in only four French charters.
2
'
The earliest and most interesting of these French charters was granted by Henry II to
Rouen in 1151 or 1152.22 It contains several clauses similar to those appearing in
preceding English charters. In particular, the Rouen charter exempts the city from all
6 Ballard identifies four such copy-cat charters in BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, supra note
14, at 23-34. Among these, Ballard shows Duleek following Bristol in 1194-1241. Id. at 30. But, Mary
Bateson argues that this assignment is due to a mistaken translation of Britolium, and that the credit actually
belongs to Breteuil. Mary Bateson, The Laws of Breteuil, Part II, XV ENGLISH HIST. REV. 514 (1900). Her
reconstruction of the laws of Breteuil contains no provisions against quartering. Id., Part Ill, at 754-57.
In other cases, copy-cat charters were granted prior to protections against quartering appearing in later
versions of the master charter. See BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, supra note 14, at 26, 27, 29,
33. Absent greater knowledge of the period's urban law it is difficult to say what rights accrued in such
situations.
17 Glasgow, for example, was granted a charter in 1175-77 "[wlith all the liberties and customs which
any of my burghs in my whole kingdom has, in the best and fullest and quietest and most honorable
manner." BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, supra note 14, at 26. Similar provisions appear in three
other charters (including one of Lynn's three). Id. at 31. Portsmouth's charters of 1194 and 1201 came
"with all liberties and free customs as well and peaceably freely and quietly as our citizens of Winchester,
or Oxford or others of our land best have and hold." Id. at 29. Either of the "Oxford or others" references
suffice for our purposes. Liverpool's charter of 1207 presents a special case; it gives the liberties of "any
free borough on the sea in our land." Id. at 33. Under this provision, the protections against quartering
appearing in the charters of the coastal boroughs of Bristol in 1188 and Ipswich in 1200 may have extended
to Liverpool.
8 In arriving at this figure I have totaled the references appearing in notes 10 through 17, supra,
excluding the questionable grants mentioned in notes 15 and 16.
'9 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 11, at 118.
20 GEORGE NORTON, COMMENTARIES ON THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION, AND CHARTERED FRANCHISES OF
THE CITY OF LONDON 144 n.* (1829).
2
'BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, supra note 14, at cv-cxxxvi. Ballard examined 102 French,
44 German, and two Spanish charters (which, he explains, served as models for many other Spanish towns)
as well as the laws administered by the Court of Burgesses of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in roughly 37
towns.
22 Id. at cxx-cxxi. Henry II was still Duke of Normandy at this time, assuming the throne of England in
1154. Id. Philip Augustus (originally known as Philip II) apparently granted the subsequent French charters
containing restrictions on forced billeting. Id. at cv.
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billeting-except that directed by the Rouen's own marshal. This is a weaker version of
the exemption from billeting that Henry I granted to London in 1131 (which prohibited
all forced billeting, be it directed by London's marshal or not). In light of the parallels
between these and other clauses, Ballard concluded that "the London charter of 1131
must have influenced the Rouen charter of twenty years later."23
Subsequent French charters also addressed forced billeting. Under charters granted
near the end of the twelfth century "the burgesses of Bourges and Dun-le-Roi were
exempted from ... the exactio culcitrarum, which appears to have been a right on the part
of the lord to obtain a loan of his tenant's bedding on his visit to the town." 24 The 1128
charter of Laon cut the other way; it bound Laon's burgesses to provide the King with
either three nights food and lodging or twenty livres. The burgesses escaped this burden
under their 1189 charter, however, by purchasing the King's right for 200 livres.
25
Were the protections against forced billeting in the charters of Bourges, Dun-le-Roi,
and Laon inspired by Rouen's charter? We can only say that they appeared after Rouen's
billeting provision and that Rouen's charter was widely copied.26 Even if English
precedents did not inspire, by way of Rouen, the restrictions on billeting that appeared in
the charters of Bourges, Dun-le-Roi, and Laon, we can be sure that the chain of causation
did not run the other way. By no means did the Third Amendment spring from French
soil. It thus appears that protections against forced quartering were few and meager
outside of Britain, and were either attributable to that country's ameliorative influence or
condemned to bloom and wither in isolation.
4. The Purveyance of Royal Lodging
While all of the British charters offering guarantees against forced billeting employed
terms broad enough to encompass the quartering of troops, none mentioned troops
explicitly.27 Troops, however, were not the only concern.28 As the London charter of
1131 suggests, the purveyance of lodging for the royal household also worried
homeowners.29 This concern became more evident in the London charter of 1155, which
23 Id. at cxxi.
24 Id. at cx-cxi. Bourges' charter was granted in 1181 and Dun-le-Roi's in 1175. Id. at cvi.
25 Id. at cxi.
26 Id. at cvii. Although some scholars argue that the charters of Rouen and Laon represent two of several
general types of twelfth century French charters, this by no means rules out the possibility that the former
influenced the latter.
27 The few French charters that addressed billeting reveal a more single-minded concern with purvey-
ance. Only Rouen's charter could have protected citizens against the quartering of troops-so long as the
marshal willed it. Id. at cxxi. The charters of Bourges, Dun-le-Roi, and Laon protected citizens only against
the demands of nobles, not of soldiers. Id. at cx-cxi.
28 As this and the subsequent section demonstrate, the Third Amendment grew out of the need to protect
homeowners' property and privacy rights. Understanding this historical background does much to undermine
Amar's claim that the Third Amendment is "centrally focused" not on individual rights but on the structural
division between civilian values and military power. Amar, supra note 3, at 1174.
29 Officially, purveyors satisfied the crown's needs by paying market prices for what they seized. This
prerogative was widely abused, however, by purveyors who paid too little, too late, or not at all; by
purveyors who sold protection from purveyance; and by those who purveyed under false pretenses. NORTON,
supra note 20, at 143-44.
In the years immediately following the Norman invasion it must have been difficult to distinguish
between the purveyance of lodging for the king's household and the quartering of troops. Royal troops were
.probably so few in number and so close to the king that they were regarded as members of his household.
With the advent of scutage, however, the king could afford larger forces, often augmenting them with
foreign professional troops. As an apparent consequence, the army outgrew the king's household and could
no longer avail itself of his right to purvey lodging. Parliament drew the line in 1331 when it enacted "[tihat
19931
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added a specific injunction against billeting by the marshal-the royal officer responsible
for purveying lodging for the king's household during its forays:30 "Within the walls no
one shall take hospitality by force or by the billet of the marshal."'" Strictly speaking,
the broad wording of London's 1131 charter rendered this extra clause unnecessary. 2
Yet it proved popular; nearly every subsequent British charter that addressed quartering
included a prohibition against billeting by the marshal.
33
The abuse of purveyance roused great resentment and by the late thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries had become one of the chief complaints of barons and Parliament.34
Purveyance of food, wares, and other chattels continued in one form or another until
Parliament purchased the fight from Charles 11,3' but the practice of purveying lodging
appears to have ended sometime earlier. 36 As we have seen, many town and borough
charters had outlawed the practice by the end of the twelfth century. 37 By the mid-
fourteenth century people living outside of urban areas had also won protections, albeit
limited ones, against the king's purveyance of lodging.38 Sir Matthew Hale cites a case
from as late as 1402 to support his contention that "the king hath a prerogative of
purveyance of lodging for his courts and ministers of justice."-39 But a close reading of the
case reveals how weak the king's power to purvey lodging had become: the king lost the
case and his officers were expelled from the property they had occupied. 0 By the middle
of the sixteenth century the purveyance of lodging seems to have disappeared entirely.
41
no Purveyance be made, but for the King, Queen, and their children, and that by good warrant and ready
payment." 8 Edw. 3, rot. 11 (1331), reprinted in ABRIDGMENT OF THE RECORDS IN THE TOWER OF LONDON
10 (collected by Robert Cotton 1679).
30 The marshal also presided over the Court of the Marshalsea, in which matters pertaining to the king's
household were heard. The pleas rolls of this little-studied court primarily carried complaints rising out of
purveyance. VII SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, at xli-lii (G. 0. Sayles ed., Selden Soc'y
Pub. No. 88, 1971).
3' BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, supra note 14, at 87.
32 Recall that the London charter of 1131 read, "And within the walls of the city no one is to be billeted;
neither for one of my household nor for one of any other is lodging to be exacted by force." I SOURCES OF
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 11, at 62.
33 See BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS, 1042-1216, supra note 14, at 87.
34 BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 395 (1960).
35 Tenures Abolition Act, 12 Car. 2, ch. 24, § 11 (1660), reprinted in THE STATUTES [OF GREAT
BRITAIN], at 378-79 (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 3rd rev. ed. 1950) [hereinafter STATUTES] see
Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 404 n.47.
36 NORTON, supra note 20, at 145.
37 See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
38 In a successful petition to Edward III, Parliament asked that throughout the country housing and food
be purveyed for the men and horses of the king's household only by bill of the marshal, and that victuals
taken be paid for prior to their departure. 21 Edw. 3, rot. 22 (1347-48) (Eng.), reprinted in ABRIDGEMENT OF
THE RECORDS IN THE TOWER OF LONDON, supra note 29, at 55.
31 MATTHEW HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 206 (D.E.C. Yale ed., Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 92,
1976).
40 Coram Rege Roll, no. 391 (Easter 1358), m. 1 (crown) at Wells in Somerset, reprinted in VI SELECT
CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, at 120-22 (G. 0. Sayles ed., Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 82, 1965). The
dispute giving rise to this case arose when the king's justices used the palace of the Bishop of Bath and
Wells for hearing claims and other royal business. It is thus unclear that the case speaks to the king's right
to purvey lodging. Nor is it clear that this case establishes the king's right to purvey the use of others'
property at all: the bishop prevailed by pointing out that the king had previously granted him the right to
turn away royal officials.
41 The seizure of lodging fails to receive mention in Allegra Woodworth's exhaustive survey of
Elizabethan purveyance. ALLEGRA WOODWARD, PURVEYANCE FOR THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD IN THE REIGN
OF QUEEN ELIZABETH (Transactions of the Am. Phil. Soc'y, New Series XXXV, Part 1, December, 1945).
Nor does purveyance of lodging appear in the catalog of purveyor's abuses that Sir Francis Bacon presented
to Parliament in 1604. Bacon, Petition to the King Touching Purveyors, in III THE LETTERS AND THE LIFE
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5. The Quartering of Troops in Britain
In the meantime, the quartering of troops grew to present a greater threat to
homeowners. Few central controls on the lodging and feeding of soldiers in the
thirteenth through sixteenth centuries existed; for the most part soldiers simply lived
off the land.42 The army repeatedly violated town and borough charters that
prohibited forced quartering.43 Invited or not, once soldiers occupied a home they
were required to pay for anything they took with tallies, chits, or billets that their
hosts could redeem for money or apply against taxes. 4 In practice, however, these
receipts often proved to be worthless, and "billeting" came to signify free room and
board.45
Soldiers traveling to and from the Continental wars in the fourteenth century often
demanded free lodging-and more-from English householders along the way. 46 Par-
liament repeatedly heard protests such as that described in Piers Plowman, where a man
complained of having lost his wife, barn, livestock, home, and the maidenhood of his
daughter to soldiers.47 Such travesties were not surprising, given that the military often
pressed tramps, beggars, and criminals into service.48 Parliament did not respond by
outlawing forced quartering, but at one point it did try to shift the practice from England
to Scotland.49
Tudor attempts to subject quartering to more centralized control through the
appointment of lords lieutenant and the appropriation of "coat and conduct money" in
the sixteenth century met with little success.50 The problem grew worse under the Stuarts
in the seventeenth century, creating tensions that helped to propel England toward civil
war.5' Rivalries between the emerging nation-states encouraged the growth of large
standing armies needing year-round facilities, but military logistics had not kept pace with
these developments.5 ' For political reasons, the House of Commons refused to provide
Charles I with adequate revenue for housing his troops, and as a consequence they sought
quarters in private homes. 3
OF FRANCIS BACON 181-87 (J. Spedding ed., 1868).
42 Hardy, supra note 2, at 69-70.
'3 Id. at 69; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 400.
4' Hardy, supra note 2, at 69; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 400.
4' Hardy, supra note 2, at 69; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 400.
46 Hardy, supra note 2, at 69-70. An interesting example of litigation concerning billeting appears in
Coram Rege Roll, no. 564 (Easter 1402), m. 28d, at Westminster in Middlesex, reprinted in VII SELECT
CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, supra note 30, at 121-23. The plaintiff in this case, a squire in the
king's army, claimed that he had suffered the theft of his horses and other chattels while staying at the
defendant's inn, and that by law, custom, and express agreement the defendant was liable for such losses.
The defendant prevailed, however, by testifying that he was but a farmer who had been forced to billet the
plaintiff without recompense and that the plaintiff had acted at his own risk.
17 Hardy, supra note 2, at 68; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 399. The latter paper reports that English
soldiers committed still worse abuses once they landed in Normandy. Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 399
n.22.
48 In one year alone, Edward I pardoned 450 murders and lesser criminals in exchange for their army
service. Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 399; Fields, supra note 2, at 197 n.15.
" Near the end of 1339, Parliament proclaimed that "the Captains and others being together, shall lie
and forage upon Scotland, and not upon the Marches of England." 13 Edw. 3, rot. 35 (1340), reprinted in
ABRIDGMENT OF THE RECORDS IN THE TOWER OF LONDON, supra note 29, at 21.
50 Hardy, supra note 2, at 69.
" Id. at 69-70; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 402-03.
32 Hardy, supra note 2, at 70; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 403.
53 LOIS G. SCHWOERER, No STANDING ARMIES 19-21 (1974).
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In 1628 these circumstances led Parliament to complain, in the Petition of Right, that
'of late great companies of soldiers and mariners have been dispersed into divers counties
of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills have been compelled to receive them
into their houses, and there to suffer them to sojourn, against the laws and customs of this
realm .... The Petition of Right asked "that your Majesty would be pleased to
remove the said soldiers and mariners, and that your people may not be so burthened in
, ,55time to come ....
Nonetheless, abuses of quartering continued to surface. Royalist and Roundhead
armies alike frequently resorted to free quartering during the English Civil War, despite
official disavowals of the practice, extensive use of tents, and attempts at organized means
of repaying unfortunate civilian hosts.56 Nor did the Restoration of 1660 improve
matters. Conflicts over forced quartering broke out between soldiers and civilians during
the Third Anglo-Dutch War of 1672-1674. 57 The winter of 1678 brought the "Highland
host": some ten thousand troops quartered in Scotland as a measure to repress the
nonconformist Presbyterian Covenanters
8
.
5
Parliament tried to assuage civilians' grievances by passing the Anti-Quartering Act
of 1679, which provided that "noe officer military or civill nor any other person whatever
shall from henceforth presume to place quarter or billet any souldier or souldiers upon any
subject or inhabitant of this realme... without his consent . . ."59 In theory, this act
provided homeowners with powerful protections against forced quartering, as it applied
without exception to town and country, in peace and war. In practice, however, James II
ignored the act.
60
James II paid for his insolence, as dissatisfaction over billeting helped to trigger
the Glorious Revolution. 61 The 1689 Bill of Rights presented to his successor,
William III, accused James II of attempting to subvert English liberties by "quartering
soldiers contrary to law .... Shortly thereafter Parliament enacted the Mutiny Act,
which forbade quartering soldiers in private homes without the consent of the
owners. 63 The act failed to allocate funds for barracks, however, instead directing
civilian authorities to billet soldiers in ale-houses, inns, stables, and the like.64
Limited though they were, the protections offered by the Mutiny Act did not extend
to the North American colonies.65
5' Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car. 1, cap. 1, § V1 (Eng.), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625-1660, at 68 (Samuel R. Gardiner ed., Oxford University Press 1968).
55 Petition of Right, § VIII, reprinted in id. at 69.
56 Hardy, supra note 2, at 71; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 403-04.
57 SCHWOERER, supra note 53, at 98-99.
51 JOHN MACKINTOSH, III THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN SCOTLAND 148-50 (1895).
59 Anti-Quartering Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 1, reprinted in STATUTES, supra note 35, at 411-12.
60 Hardy, supra note 2, at 71; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 405.
61 SCHWOERER, supra note 53, at 137-47.
62 Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. 2, cap. 2, reprinted in STATUTES, supra note 35, at 426-31. An
accusation concerning the raising and keeping of a standing army in time of peace immediately preceded this
complaint about quartering. Id. Curiously, the document offers a remedy only for the former; it declares the
raising or keeping of a standing army without the consent of the Parliament illegal, but fails to explicitly
address quartering. Id. Schwoerer attributes this to haste and possibly reluctance to blame James II for
something that could probably also have been charged against William Il. LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 71 (1981).
63 Mutiny Act, 1689, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, cap. 4 (Eng.), relevant text reprinted in GREAT BRITAIN WAR
OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW (Hon. Hugh Godley ed., 6th ed. 1914).64 id.
65 Hardy, supra note 2, at 73.
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B. American Origins of the Third Amendment
1. Prelude to Revolution
The Third Amendment was directly inspired by the abuses colonialists suffered at the
hands of British soldiers immediately prior to and during the Revolutionary War. The
colonies, however, had seen quartering even before the 1700s. Indeed, each time the
British government launched a significant military operation in North America, it brought
along quartering problems. Civilians in Massachusetts and Connecticut complained about
the quartering of soldiers in private homes as early as King Philip's War (1675-1676).66
Similar allegations surfaced in New York at the time of the Dominion of New England
in 1688.6' The quartering of troops also led to trouble in the West Indies, Virginia, South
Carolina, and Nova Scotia during the course of the seventeenth century.
68
Colonial legislatures responded to these grievances by enacting legal protections
against quartering. The first of these appeared in the New York Assembly's 1683 Charter
of Libertyes and Priviledges: "Noe Freeman shall be compelled to receive any Marriners
or Souldiers into his house and there suffer them to Sojourne, against their willes provided
Alwayes it be not in time of Actuall Warr within this province."-
69
This marks the first instance of a dual standard for quartering, whereby the normally
stringent consent requirement was relaxed during times of "Actuall Warr." All prior
protections against forced billeting had stated categorically that no troops would be
quartered in a home without the owner's consent-whether it be in time of war or
peace.7" Perhaps this American innovation arose out of a conflict between respect for
English legal traditions and the need for protection from New World dangers. Whatever
the inspiration for the dual standard, it won the approval of American lawmakers. They
almost always incorporated the dual standard in subsequent protections from quartering-
including the Third Amendment.7'
The quartering of soldiers became a major problem for the colonists during the French
and Indian War (1754-1763), which brought thousands of British regulars to North
America.72 American colonists repeatedly denied General Edward Braddock's requests
for quarters and provisions. 73 His successor, John Campell, Earl of Londoun, complained
in 1756 that Americans cited "Rights and Privileges" while opposing his efforts at nearly
every turn.74 But even the most spirited protests sometimes failed to stop the British
from forcing troops on homeowners.75
66 Hardy, supra note 2, at 73; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 414.
67 Hardy, supra note 2, at 73; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 414.
6' Hardy, supra note 2, at 73; Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 414.
69 Reprinted in I THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 166 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980). Other colonial
legislatures enacted similar measures with exceptions for "innholders or other houses of entertainment."
Hardy, supra note 2, at 74. In this regard such measures resembled the Mutiny Act. See supra notes 63-65
and accompanying text.
'0 The one exception to this rule comes not from Britain, but from France: the 1151-52 charter of Rouen,
which allowed billeting at the behest of the town's marshal. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying test.
"' The one exception occurs in Louisiana's state constitution, which forbids all unconsented quartering.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 6. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
7 Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 414; Fields, supra note 2, at 200.
'3 Hardy, supra note 2, at 74.
74 id.
75 For a detailed account of quartering in Pennsylvania during the French and Indian War see Jeffrey L.
Scheib, Barracks for the Borough: A Constitutional Question in Colonial Lancaster, 87 J. LANCASTER
COUNTY HIST. SOC'Y 53 (1983). Scheib also makes reference to quartering in New York and Massachusetts.
Id. at 55.
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After Pontiac's War concluded in 1763 the British government began to seek ways
to shift the financial burden of defending the western frontier onto the colonies.76 In
1765, Parliament passed the Quartering Act, requiring the colonists to bear the costs of
providing barracks and supplies for British soldiers stationed in the Colonies.77 Should
these barracks prove insufficient, the Act stipulated that troops be quartered in inns, livery
stables, and ale-houses.78 If these too fell short, the troops could be quartered in other
private buildings. 79 This last alternative opened the door to virtually limitless abuse and
roused great resentment in the colonies.8 0 To make matters worse, Parliament enacted
the hated Stamp Act of 1765 in order to squeeze from the colonists the revenue required
to satisfy the Quartering Act's demands.8' "As a result, the problems related to the
quartering of soldiers became entwined with the volatile political issue of 'taxation
without representation.' -82
Resistance to the burdens of quartering British troops grew and spread throughout
North America.83 When New York refused to fully carry out the terms of the Quartering
Act, Parliament suspended its Assembly until that body voted to support the royal troops
stationed in New York.84 October 1768 saw the governor of Massachusetts quarter troops
in the state-house after the selectmen of Boston refused to provide them with quarters.
In response to the Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, Parliament passed five
acts.86 Among them was a new Quartering Act, approved in June 1774.87 Because it
authorized the quartering of troops in private homes (as opposed to private buildings), the
colonists regarded this Quartering Act as even more offensive than its 1765 predecessor
and they labeled it as one of the "Intolerable Acts.'' 8
Parliament's response to the Boston Tea Party triggered a series of political statements
that addressed the quartering issue, culminating in the Declaration of Independence in
1776. The First Continental Congress complained of this latest Quartering Act in its
76 Fields, supra note 2, at 200.
77 Quartering Act of 1765, 5 Geo. 3, ch. 33, IX ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 656 (Merrill Jensen
& David G. Douglas eds., 1953).
78 id.
79 Id.
50 Consider Samuel Adams' complaint in the Boston Gazette, Oct. 17, 1768:
Where Law ends, (says Mr. Locke) TYRANNY begins, if the Law be transgress'd to
another's harm: No one I believe will deny the truth of the observation, and therefore I
again appeal to common sense, whether the act which provides for the quartering and
billeting the King's troops, was not TRANSGRESS'D, when the barracks at the Castle WHICH
ARE SUFFICIENT TO CONTAIN MORE than the whole number of soldiers now in this town,
were ABSOLUTELY REFUS'D: This I presume cannot be contested.
Reprinted in V THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 215 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987)
(emphasis in original).
Adams also cited the abuses of quartering in his 1772 "List of Infringements and Violations of
Rights." Reprinted in Hardy, supra note 2, at 79.
"I Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 415; Fields, supra note 2, at 200.
82 Fields, supra note 2, at 200.
13 Hardy reports resistance to quartering having appeared in Quebec, Montreal, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, Maryland, East Florida, and Georgia during this time. Hardy, supra note 2, at 76-
77.
84 Id. at 76.
8 Wurfel, supra note 2, at 726.
86 id.
87 Quartering Act of 1774, 14 Geo. 3, ch. 54.
" Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 416; Fields, supra note 2, at 201.
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Declaration and Resolves of 1774 and called for a repeal of the Act.8 9 In 1775, the
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms also cited the 1774 statute
passed "for quartering soldiers upon the colonists in time of profound peace." 90 Finally,
the Declaration of Independence justified breaking the "political bands" that had bound
the colonists to England by explaining that George III had "combined with others to
subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws;
giving his Assent to their acts of pretended legislation: For quartering large bodies of
armed troops among us....""
Those opposing revolution also raised the specter of quartering. Pennsylvanian Joseph
Galloway tried to dissuade his countrymen from rebellion by warning that the American
army would prove too undisciplined, "travelling over your estates, entering your houses-
your castles ... seizing your property... ravishing your wives and daughters, and
afterwards plunging the dagger into their tender bosoms." 92 Galloway was correct in
part; the American forces did quarter troops on civilians during the Revolutionary War
(as did the British).93 He seems, however, to have exaggerated the threat.
Thanks in large part to Whig rhetoric, American military leaders held an aversion to
quartering. They tried to avoid quartering by building barracks, using public buildings, and
avoiding towns.94 What little American quartering there was occurred early in the war,
before the states' legislatures had made other provisions for housing troops.95
By the war's end, the legislatures of Delaware, Maryland, and Massachusetts had
issued declarations of rights protecting their civilians from unchecked billeting. Delaware's
quartering provision set the pattern for the other two states: "That no soldier ought to be
quartered in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner; and in time of
war in such manner only as the Legislature shall direct." 96 All of these states thus
" Resolved, N. C. D. That the following acts of Parliament are infringements and violations of the
rights of the colonists; and that the repeal of them is essentially necessary in order to restore harmony
between Great Britain and the American colonies, viz.., the act passed in the same session for the better
providing suitable quarters for officers and soldiers in his Majesty's service in North-America. Reprinted in I
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 218 (B. Schwartz ed., 1971).
90 SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 296 (R. Perry ed., 1952).
9' DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776).
92 Hardy, supra note 2, at 79.
9' Id. at 79-80. For a particularly vivid description of the quartering of American troops, see Major
Thompson's Deposition: Being a Spirited Protest to the General Court by a Brookline Patriot of 1775,
Against the Forcible Quartering of Soldiers in his Domicile, PUBLICATIONS OF THE BROOKLINE HISTORICAL
PUBLICATION SOCIETY 17 (1900). Major Thompson's plight must have been well known to his contemporar-
ies; Joseph Hawley called it "downright and intolerably wrong" in a letter he wrote to Elbridge Gerry in
February 18, 1776, asking him to help reform the American Army. V THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 80, at 216. Gerry apparently took Hawley's admonitions seriously; he later argued that the Third
Amendment should put civil magistrates in control of quartering. I ANNALS OF CONG. 752 (Gales & Seaton
eds., 1789). See also infra note 213.
9' G. Bradsher, Preserving the Revolution: Civil-Military Relations During the American War for
Independence, 1775-1783, at 498 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts).
'5 Id. See also Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 417 n.l 11.
96 Although Delaware's Declaration of Rights borrowed heavily from the declarations of Pennsylvania
and Virginia in other respects, its quartering provision was a unique addition. DEL. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, § 21 (1776), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 90, at 339.
Unlike Delaware's free-standing declaration of rights, the declarations subsequently issued by Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire were attached to their constitutions. Maryland essentially copied
Delaware's quartering provision: "That no soldier ought to be quartered in any house, in time of peace,
without the consent of the owner; and in time of war in such manner only, as the Legislature shall direct."
MD. CONST. art. XXVIII (1776), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 90, at 348.
Massachusetts' restriction on quartering differed only in its reference to the intermediary role of the
civil magistrate: "In time of peace, no soldier ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the
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applied the uniquely American dual standard that first appeared in the New York
Assembly's 1683 Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges.97
2. The Path to Ratification
Defeated, Britain withdrew its troops from the colonies. Since this assuaged their fears
of forced billeting and they were growing weary of debate, the delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 turned down Charles Pinckney's proposal for a
constitutional prohibition on the quartering of soldiers.9" Opponents of the Constitution
seized upon the absence of a bill of rights to buttress their arguments against a strong
central government. The analysis in "The Federal Farmer" of the Constitution's failure
to address quartering provides an excellent survey of the Anti-Federalists' arguments
against a powerful central government:
[I]s there any provision in the constitution to prevent the quartering of
soldiers on the inhabitants? you will answer, there is not. This may
sometimes be deemed a necessary measure in support of armies; on what
principle can the people claim the right to be exempt from this burden? they
will urge, perhaps, the practice of the country, and the provisions made in
some of the state constitutions-they will be answered, that their claim thus
to be exempt is not founded in nature, but only in custom and opinion, or
at best, in stipulations in some of the state constitutions, which are local, and
inferior in their operation, and can have no controul over the general
government-that they had adopted a federal constitution-had noticed several
rights, but had been totally silent about this exemption-that they had given
general powers relative to the subject, which, in their operation, regularly
destroyed the claim. Though it is not to be presumed, that we are in any
immediate danger from this quarter, yet it is fit and proper to establish,
beyond dispute, those rights which are particularly valuable to individuals,
and essential to the permanency and duration of free government.99
The Anti-Federalists took a dim view of quartering. Samuel Chase objected that
"Congress will have a right to quarter soldiers in our private houses, not only in time of
war, but also in time of peace."l° "The Federal Farmer" categorically demanded that
owner; and in time of war, such quarters ought not to be made but by the civil magistrate, in a manner
ordained by the legislature." MASS. CONST. art. XXVII (1780), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES,
supra note 90, at 377.
New Hampshire also regulated quartering, but did so only after the 1783 Treaty of Peace had brought
the conflict to a close. In essence, it copied Massachusetts' quartering article: "No soldier in time of peace,
shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; and in time of war, such quarters ought
not to be made but by the civil magistrate, in a manner ordained by the legislature." N.H. CONST. art. I,
§ XXVII (1784), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 90, at 385.
'7 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
" EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 5-6 (1957). Pinckney's
proposal, submitted Monday, August 20, read: "No soldier shall be quartered in any house, in time of peace,
without consent of the owner." JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 427
(G. Hunt & J. Scott eds., 1920) (1840). It thus took the same form as the quartering amendments that
Maryland and New Hampshire later proposed for the Bill of Rights. See infra notes 107, 108.
99 Letters from the Federal Farmer, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 329 (H. Storing
ed., 1981).
'0o Notes of Speeches Delivered to the Maryland Ratifying Convention, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 86 (H.Storing ed., 1981) (emphasis in the original).
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"no soldier be quartered on the citizens without their consent," and made no exception
for quartering controlled by law in times of war.'
Although the Anti-Federalists did not ultimately prevail, they gave voice to a wide-
spread concern. Eight of the state ratifying conventions sent proposals for a bill of rights
to Congress. Five of these proposals contained protections against quartering. Of the
ninety distinct types of provisions forwarded to Congress among all of the states'
proposals, only seven appeared more often than provisions that addressed quartering.0 2
This article will turn now to examining the relations between these quartering amendments
proposed by the states, the quartering amendment that Madison submitted to Congress,
and the Third Amendment in its final form.
3. Proposed Quartering Amendments
James Madison took the lead in presenting a bill of rights to the first Congress. He
distilled his proposal for the Bill of Rights from the best and most popular amendments
suggested by the state conventions.1 3 He realized that wandering from their guidelines
would risk failure: "Two or three contentious additions would even now prostrate the
whole project."'" Yet his quartering amendment strayed from the states' proposals.
Even supposing that Madison looked to outside sources for inspiration, he gave quartering
a unique treatment. Nothing quite like it had appeared in state constitutions, political
commentaries, or English laws. 0 5 The quartering amendment that Madison offered in
his address to the House read: "No soldiers shall in time of peace be quartered in any
house without the consent of the owner; nor at any time, but in a manner warranted by
law."' 0 6 To see what marks this as special we must look to the alternatives offered by
the states' proposed amendments.
The states offered two other versions of a quartering amendment. The first version
forbade quartering without consent in times of peace, but was silent in regard to
quartering at other times. This version appeared in the proposals of Maryland' 7 and
1o Id. at 262.
102 These seven provisions concerned the number of Representatives, religious freedom, the right to a
jury trial, powers reserved to the states, regulation of elections, curbs on federal power to tax, and standing
armies. DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 161-65.
'03 Id. at 36.
"o Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (August 21, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 349 (C. Hobson and R. Rutland eds., 1985).
105 But for the recent discovery of a working draft of the Bill of Rights that Roger Sherman prepared
while sitting in the House committee responsible for reviewing Madison's proposal, the unusual wording of
Madison's quartering amendment might lead us to suspect that it arose out of an error in transcription. Prior
to finding Sherman's draft, the only known version of Madison's proposed bill of rights came to us from
shorthand notes prepared for the Congressional Register by one Thomas Lloyd, a stenographer known for
drinking on the job and spicing up his notes with sketches of nudes. Madison himself had condemned the
Register as exhibiting "the strongest evidences of mutilation and perversion." Mitgang, Handwritten Draft
of a Bill of Rights Found, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1987, § A, at 1. See also PEOPLE, Aug.17, 1987, at 71.
Article Six of Sherman's draft of the Bill of Rights shows the obvious influence of Madison's proposed
quartering amendment: "No soldier shall be quartered in any private house in time of Peace, nor at any
time, but by authority of law." Text of Proposal for a Separate Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1987, §
C, at 21. Compare this with Madison's version, infra note 106 and accompanying text.
'0' I ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789). Thereafter Madison's proposed amendments
went to a select committee composed of one member from each of the eleven states then represented in
Congress. Id. at 664-65.
'o7 "That soldiers be not quartered, in time of peace, upon private houses, without the consent of the
owners." Amendments Proposed by Maryland Convention Committee, art. 10, in DUMBAULD, supra note 98,
at 178.
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New Hampshire. ° s The second version likewise prohibited forced quartering in times
of peace, but in addition subjected wartime quartering to legal controls. This version
appeared in the proposals offered by Virginia, °9 New York," ° and North Caroli-
na."' This second version eventually found its way into the Third Amendment." 2
How should we go about interpreting these three different sorts of quartering amend-
ments? The key is in what they do not say. Each categorically prohibited quartering
without consent in times of peace-that much is clear. They differ, however, in what they
required in the absence of peace.
a. The First Proposed Version
The first version of the states' proposed amendments says nothing about how to deal
with quartering when the nation no longer finds itself at peace. One would have to look
elsewhere at such times to determine the constitutional limits on quartering, most probably
to the other amendments in the Bill of Rights and to Articles I and II of the Constitution.
Subsection B will discuss similar problems of constitutional interpretation with regard to
the second version of the states' proposed quartering amendments. For now it suffices to
wonder why Maryland and New Hampshire, the states forwarding the first version,
neglected to say anything about quartering outside times of peace. This is particularly
puzzling given that their own constitutions put wartime quartering in the control of the
legislature (the same approach taken by the states proposing the second version)."13
The answer to this riddle may lie in the changing political climate of the times.
Maryland and New Hampshire ratified their constitutions in 1776 and 1784, respective-
ly."' Their proposed amendments issued forth several years later in 1788. '" In the
interim, the Anti-Federalists had come onto the political scene." 6 Perhaps disagreement
broke out between those who preferred the quartering provisions in the state constitutions
and Anti-Federalists who wanted stiffer prohibitions against quartering." 7 Such political
'08 New Hampshire's variation came in the same article of the proposal with a restriction on standing
armies, following up with "nor shall Soldiers in Time of Peace be quartered upon private Houses without
the consent of the Owners." Amendments Proposed by New Hampshire Convention, art. 10, in DUMBAULD,
supra note 98, at 182.
" "That no Soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the laws direct." Amendments Proposed by Virginia
Convention, art. 18, in DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 185.
"o "That in time of Peace no Soldier ought to be quartered in any House without the consent of the
Owner, and in time of War only by the Civil Magistrate in such manner as the Laws may direct."
Amendments Proposed by New York Convention, in DUMBAULD, supra note 90, at 190.
"' "That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner, and in time of war in such manner only as the Laws direct." Amendments Proposed by North
Carolina Convention, art. 18, in DUMBAULD, supra note 90, at 201.
... It also tracks the wording of most of the quartering provisions found in the states' constitutions. See
infra notes 212-27, and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 96.
114 id.
115 DUMBAULD, supra note 97, at 177, 181.
1I6 The Anti-Federalists' critiques of centralized national power began in earnest following the
publication of the Constitution in 1787. 1 THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST, at x-xi (W. Allen & G. Lloyd
eds., 1985). No major Anti-Federalist documents were published in New Hampshire prior to 1787 nor in
Maryland prior to 1788. See I THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 99, at x-xi.
"7 With regard to the Anti-Federalist view, see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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divisions may have kept the Maryland and New Hampshire conventions from agreeing to
a quartering amendment with more specific terms."'
b. The Second Proposed Version
Like the first version of the states' proposed quartering amendments, the second
version prohibited forced quartering of troops in times of peace. Unlike the first version,
the second version went on to specify that during times of war soldiers be quartered
"only as the laws direct."".9 This additional clause lightens the burden of constitutional
interpretation. There appears to be little doubt it was meant to put control of wartime
quartering in the hands of Congress. 2 ' Nevertheless, the second version of the states'
proposed quartering amendments still leaves us with an interpretative puzzle. While it
effectively deals with the problems of quartering during times of peace and war, it fails
to address explicitly the gray area between these two extremes. Therein lies the broad
category of unrest, which includes insurrection, low-level conflict, and the period between
the advent of a threat to national security and a formal declaration of war.
One can avoid the challenges of interpreting within this lacuna only by squeezing
"unrest" into either "peace" or "war." But could the founders have failed to recognize
a distinct condition of unrest? One would not expect lawyers and philosophers to use
words so casually, but the founders were primarily statesmen. They may sometimes have
put style before clarity in drafting the Bill of Rights. In any case, restricting oneself to
"peace" and "war" does not entirely violate common usage. Supposing the founders did
limit themselves to "peace" or "war," into which camp would they have put unrest? It
seems most likely that the founders would have officially classified unrest as an instance
of peace. The Constitution tends to treat war in a narrow and technical manner, thereby
making it less susceptible to broad interpretations. 2' By default, "peace" would thus
describe any time when no official declaration of war is in effect. This approach may well
have appealed to the founders. It maximizes protection from quartering by extending
homeowners' peacetime rights to periods of unrest. It also encourages Congress to
deliberate seriously before declaring war because it adds quartering to the list of evils that
such action may invite.
But might not the founders have thought of unrest as something distinct from peace
and war? There are sound reasons to believe that they did indeed. The drafters of the
states' proposed quartering amendments referred to war, rebellion, insurrection, and
invasion elsewhere in the documents they forwarded to Congress, and used these words
in specific contexts.' This implies that they regarded these words as legal terms having
.. Why did the Anti-Federalists in Virginia, New York, and North Carolina not have a similar effect on
the second version of the states' proposed quartering amendments? None of these three states had constitu-
tional protections from quartering. Perhaps this weakened Anti-Federalist arguments for the long leap to a
strict prohibition on quartering.
"9 Amendments Proposed by Virginia Convention, art. 18. DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 185. The
amendments proposed by New York and North Carolina employ similar wording. See supra notes 110, 111.
120 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States .... Prior examples of quartering provisions in the state constitutions of Delaware,
Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire made the legislature's control over wartime quartering
explicit. See supra note 95. The second version's deviation from these precedents may probably be attributed
to stylistic preferences.
.2 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
122 See Amendments Proposed by Maryland Convention Committee, art. 13, DUMBAULD, supra note 98,
at 178; Amendments Proposed by New Hampshire Convention, art. 12, DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 182;
Amendments Proposed by Virginia Committee, amend. X1, DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 187; Amendments
Proposed by New York Convention, art. 16, DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 190; Amendments Proposed by
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independent meanings, and that they were not wont to interchange them casually. The
Constitution likewise uses these words carefully, giving Congress a power for declaring
war at one point 2 3 and a power "for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" at another.
124
The use of these special terms denoting conditions of unrest intermediary to peace and
war appears to be consistent with the manner of thought that military historians ascribe
to the founders. "The Revolutionary generation did not identify sharp dividing lines
between war and peace," explains Reginald C. Stuart.'25 Instead, they distinguished
between perfect wars, which were conducted in a formal manner towards limited ends,
and imperfect wars, such as the intermittent, ill-defined skirmishes with Indians on the
northern and western borders. 26 The founders derived these views on war from the
writings of great legal theorists such as Hugo Grotius and Baron Samuel von
Pufendorf. 27
These distinctions also fit military policies of the time. The founders were quite
familiar with civil unrest short of war. They had not only employed it themselves in order
to irritate Britain; they had also seen it threaten their own nation's unity. Hence Alexander
Hamilton's complaint of "the revolt of a part of the State of North Carolina, the late
menacing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in
Massachusetts...."2 Backcountry unrest remained a persistent problem for the new
country, as evidenced in the Whiskey Rebellion in 1791-1794, in subsequent separatist
movements, 29 and in low-level Indian conflicts that repeatedly plagued the borders. In
each of these instances government authorities quelled the unrest not by formally
declaring war, but by direct applications of military force.
If those who drafted the second proposed quartering amendment did recognize a
condition of unrest distinct from peace and war, why did they not address it directly?
They may simply have drafted the amendment sloppily. Or perhaps political conflict
forced them to keep their wording vague, just as political conflict may have shaped the
first version. Alternatively, the drafters may have wished to leave open the possibility that
the executive would control quartering during times of unrest, as discussed below with
regard to the rejection of Madison's proposed amendment. 3 '
Assuming the recognition of a distinct condition of unrest, what rights would
homeowners have had at such times under the second version of the states' proposed
quartering amendments? Homeowners would want to argue that the government's power
to quarter troops during wartime should not be taken to disparage their retained right to
turn away troops during times of unrest. The states proposing the second version of the
North Carolina Convention, amend. XI, XII, DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 178.
123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
124 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
25 REGINALD C. STUART, WAR AND AMERICAN THOUGHT: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MONROE
DOCTRINE 62 (1982).
126 Id. at 9.
127 Grotius had explained that "no war is considered to be lawful, regular, and formal, except that which
is begun and carried out by the sovereign power of each country." H. GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND
PEACE 314-15 (A. Campbell trans., 1901). Pufendorf drew a similar line between "Solemn" and "Less
Solemn" wars. S. PUFENDORF, VIIi OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 93-94 (B. Kennet trans., 1717).
Stuart nonetheless cautions us about over-generalizing about the founders' views on war. STUART, supra
note 125, at 9.
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 33 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed., 1941). The "rebellions in Massachusetts"
refers to Shays' rebellion of 1786-1787, an event that did much to increase sympathies for scrapping the
Articles of Confederation and instituting a constitution that provided stronger central powers.
'29 D. FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED 840-41 (1989).
"0 See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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states' quartering amendments seemed to invite such claims; each one asked Congress to
protect retained rights of the sort eventually safeguarded in the Ninth Amendment.'13
This argument faces a telling objection: that which has never existed cannot be
retained.13 1 Most state constitutions of the period had not yet even prohibited forced
quartering during peacetime, and none had explicitly extended the right to times of unrest.
Nor had homeowners enjoyed a de facto right to be free of quartering during times of
unrest-hence their demands for the protection of a quartering amendment.1
3
The founders would have had several good reasons to oppose homeowners' attempts
to retain their peacetime rights in periods of unrest. Quartering would probably have been
most sorely needed during such times. Unrest tends to rise up unexpectedly, far from
centers of power-conditions under which barracks are often unavailable.134 Once
Congress has declared war, the need for forced billeting largely disappears because there
is more time to prepare military housing and there is increased public support for the war
effort. Modem experience has shown that civilians readily consent to quartering when
threatened by a common enemy. 35 Residents in a rebellious area, however, are much
less likely to open their homes to troops, thus requiring the State to force quartering on
them. 36 Doing so has the added benefit of monitoring and suppressing further insurrec-
tion. These strong policy arguments seem destined to overcome any claims that
homeowners might make for extending their peacetime rights to times of unrest. If so,
which branch of government should control quartering during unrest-the Executive or the
Legislature?
Proponents of executive control could argue that during times of unrest the Executive
must be free to act quickly and decisively, without waiting for Congressional approv-
al.' 37 Early American responses to unrest support this claim. 38 They could further
argue that the second version of the states' proposed quartering amendments gives power
over wartime quartering to lawmakers because that is the only time at which the
' They were the only states to do so. DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 162. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
132 This objection would appear to preclude further appeals of the Ninth Amendment: "It is far from
obvious that [the Ninth Amendment] empowers judges to announce additional constitutional rights. Its
history suggests it was meant merely to preclude any inference from the Bill of Rights that would lead to an
unnaturally broad interpretation of the granted federal powers." D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT 48 (1985). But see Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3
(1988) ("[Tihe judicial protection of unenumerated rights is consistent with the structural features of the
Constitution, and.., philosophical skepticism about the idea of 'retained rights' should not operate as a bar
to their recognition.").
133 Perhaps today homeowners could appeal to the privacy rights they enjoy by the grace of substantive
due process. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134 As proof of this, consider that contemporary instances of a government imposing the quartering of
troops on its own civilians have arisen during times of civil unrest, not war. See Premier of India Meets Sikh
Leader, N.Y. TIMES, December 29, 1990, § 1, at 3; and Reports from Yerevan and Stepanakert on 29th
September, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 3, 1988, part 1. In the latter, a Soviet colonel of
troops sent to quell Armenian unrest makes an ominous claim: "There have been many examples of
kindness on the part of the inhabitants in the billeting of troops, they have been helpful." The story reveals
that the soldiers had in fact been attacked by locals.
115 During World War II, civilians often opened their houses to military personnel on pass or leave.
Troops on isolated assignments were also sometimes invited into local homes. Having been consented to,
such quartering did not offend the Third Amendment. Wurfel, supra note 2, at 734.
136 Americans' behavior in the years leading up to the Revolutionary War should give proof enough of
that. See supra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
137 This was a far greater problem in the 1700s than it is today, given improvements in transportation
and communication.
138 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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legislature can hope to direct quartering effectively. At all other times, the power to
quarter troops must be wielded by the Commander in Chief if it is to be wielded well.'39
Despite these policy arguments, those who advocated executive control over quartering
during times of unrest would have found it difficult to defend their position in
Constitutional terms. On the one hand, they could depend on the clause vesting executive
powers in the president. 4 ° Hamilton, for example, maintained that this power was
"subject only to the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the
instrument."'' Less controversially, they could depend on the executive's designation
as commander in chief.'42 Neither argument, however, convinced the Youngstown court
that the Executive has broad "inherent" powers.' 43
Constitutional arguments for giving the legislature control over quartering during
unrest carry more weight. The Constitution recognizes Congressional authority to act
during times of unrest by giving it the power to call forth the militia "to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions."'" Congress also has
the power "To raise and support Armies, '" 41 and "To make rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."' 46 These powers operate in full force
during times of unrest and appear wide enough to include the quartering of troops.
147
More generally, the Constitution's grant of congressional authority in these areas indicates
a deep-seated mistrust of the Executive's military power. This makes it all the more
doubtful that the drafters of the second version of the proposed quartering amendments
intended to let the Executive set the terms of quartering during times of unrest.
c. Madison's Proposed Version
Madison suggested a uniquely worded quartering amendment. Like both versions of
the quartering amendments offered by the states, his proposed amendment prohibited
forced billeting during times of peace. Madison, however, went on to forbid quartering
"at any time, but in a manner warranted by law.' ' 48 This departed from the states'
proposed quartering amendments by explicitly giving Congress the power to direct
"' For judicial recognition of the need for executive action in such cases, see the concurring opinions in
Youngstown Street & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and infra note 143.
141 U.S. CONST. art. 11, §1, cl. 1.
4 ' Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, in XV THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (H. Syrett ed., 1969)
(emphasis in the original).
142 U.S. CONST. art. I1, §2, cl. 1.
143 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Note, though, that the concurring
opinions may yet leave room for the president to seize control of quartering during times of unrest. "We
must therefore put to one side consideration of what powers the President would have had if... the seizure
had been only for a short, explicitly temporary period, to be terminated automatically unless Congressional
approval were given." Id. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); "[lln the absence of [specific procedures laid
down] by Congress, the President's independent power to act depends on the gravity of the situation
confronting the nation." Id. at 662 (Jackson, J., concurring).
144 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
145 Id. at cl. 12.
146 Id. at cl. 14.
147 If so, their express enumeration would exempt them from the Executive's reach even under
Hamilton's argument. If not, Congress could still claim that it holds an implied power to quarter troops as a
necessary and proper means of fulfilling its Constitutional duties to support armies. See McCulloch v.
Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
148 DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 207.
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quartering whenever the nation was other than at peace.'49 Madison's revision of the
states' proposals may have stemmed from his recognition that they held potentially
dangerous ambiguities, raising interpretative problems by their having failed to address
the gap between peace and war. Madison neatly avoided these problems by extending
legislative control to "any time" outside of peace. This still leaves the exact boundary
between peace and non-peace undefined, but it vastly narrows the range within which the
line must be drawn. More importantly, it leaves no room for the Executive to step in and
assert the power to quarter troops; jurisdiction over the home lies either with its owner
(during peace) or with Congress (at all other times).
In spite of the apparent superiority of Madison's quartering amendment, the select
committee to which it and Madison's other proposed amendments were referred rejected
it for a quartering amendment that read essentially the same as the second version of the
states' proposals and the final version of Third Amendment. 50 It would be rash to
conclude, however, that the committee thereby thwarted Madison's plans. Perhaps he
foresaw counterproposals for quartering amendments giving the Executive unqualified
control over quartering in times of unrest, or for denying citizens the right to turn away
troops at all.'' Faced with the possibility of very weak amendments such as these,
Madison may have advanced his amendment with an eye to the middle position that
would survive the committee's compromises. Regardless of Madison's reaction, the
committee's decision should pique interest. Why did the committee reject Madison's
carefully worded amendment for an alternative that seems to ignore the issue of quartering
during times of unrest? Unfortunately, we have no record of the committee's proceedings.
A discussion of the intentions giving rise to the second version of the states' proposed
quartering amendments, however, provides three possible reasons for the rejection of
Madison's proposal: the failure to recognize an intermediary to war and peace; negligence;
or purposeful silence.
The prior discussion of the founders' views on war, peace, and unrest casts doubt on
the first of these possibilities. It also seems unlikely that the committee negligently failed
to notice the unique aspects of Madison's quartering amendment, especially because
"' There were other, more subtle differences. Fields & Hardy point out that the nearly all of the state
constitutions before Madison employed "ought" in restricting quartering. The exception lay in New
Hampshire's constitution, which employed "shall." Fields & Hardy, supra note 2, at 420. As these authors
see it, "Madison substituted the mandatory imperative 'shall' for the 'oughts' that had characterized those
earlier documents; thus making the provision a true 'right.' " Id. at 425 (footnotes omitted). The proposed
quartering amendments showed a similar bias, with all but Maryland and New Hampshire employing
"ought." Maryland's proposal used no auxiliary verb. See supra note 104. New Hampshire's proposal used
"shall." See supra note 105.
Note, too, that the second version of the states' proposed quartering amendments required that wartime
quartering be done only "as the laws direct." Amendments Proposed by Virginia Convention, art. 18, in
DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 185. The amendments proposed by New York and North Carolina employed
similar wording. See supra notes 109, 110. Madison changed this to "a manner warranted by law."
DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 207. While he may have been acting for entirely stylistic reasons, perhaps
Madison was implying that, above and beyond statutory and constitutional restraints, quartering ought to
conform with natural law. This would have given normative weight to the amendment's restrictions and
alluded to limits beyond which the State could not justifiably intrude-constitution or no.
IS' The committee recommended a quartering amendment that read, "No soldier shall, in time of peace,
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." I ANNALS OF CONG. 752 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789).
"' At least one member of the committee, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, appears to have favored an
amendment stripping homeowners of the right to turn away troops in times of peace. In later House debate
over what would become the Third Amendment, Sherman claimed "that it was absolutely necessary that
marching troops should have quarters, whether in time of peace or war, and that it ought not to be put in the
power of an individual to obstruct the public service." Id. at 751-52.
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Madison himself was on the committee to explain and defend his proposal. Did the
committee reject Madison's proposed quartering amendment because it preferred to remain
silent on the issue of who should control quartering during times of unrest? There are
several reasons why it may have done so. The committee may have been unable or
unwilling to resolve the issue, or perhaps it preferred the status quo for fear that the states
would reject a revised quartering amendment. 5 ' The most intriguing conjecture,
however, is that the committee wanted to give the Executive power over quartering in
times of unrest, or at least to not foreclose that option. This explanation finds support in
policy, politics, and actual practice.
For reasons of policy discussed above, the committee may have felt that the Executive
was best able to direct quartering during border conflicts, invasions, and rebellions, but
expressly giving the Executive such authority would have stirred up a political tempest.
The states had demanded a Bill of Rights-not a Bill of Powers. Had the committee
wanted to quietly leave room for the Executive to assume control over quartering during
times of unrest, however, it could hardly have done better than the Third Amendment as
written. If such was the committee's intent, it probably would have been pleased with the
actual practice of quartering during the Civil War, as the next section will reveal.
III. THE THIRD AMENDMENT IN PRACTICE AND THEORY
A. Quartering Under the Third Amendment
It should not be surprising to discover that United States troops have been quartered
contrary to the Third Amendment; the Bill of Rights suffers violations all too frequently.
It would be remarkable, however, if the Third Amendment had been violated openly and
repeatedly over a period of several years without creating an uproar. Yet this seems to
have been the case with regard to the quartering of troops during the War of 1812 and the
Civil War.'
53
52 The committee rewrote other proposed amendments without apparent regard for such concerns,
however. In drafting what would eventually become the Second Amendment, for example, the committee
arguably associated the right to bear arms with the support of the militia: "A well regulated militia,
composed of the body of the People, being the best security of a free State, the right of the People to keep
and bear arms, shall not be infringed .... DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 210-11. Yet even the most similar
of the states' proposed amendments clearly insulates the right to bear arms from their use in militias: "That
the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia composed of the body of the
people trained to arms is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State." Amendments Proposed by
Virginia Convention, art. 17. DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 185. See also Amendments Proposed by North
Carolina Convention, art. 17. DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 201. Other states took a more radical stance.
See, for example, New Hampshire's proposal: "Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are
or have been in Actual Rebellion." Amendments Proposed by New Hampshire Convention, art. 12.
DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 182. See also Amendments Proposed by Pennsylvania Convention Minority,
art. 7. DUMBAULD, supra note 98, at 174.
153 These two conflicts arguably mark the only times that U.S. troops have engaged in major military
conflicts on their native soil. Most of the action in the other contender for this category, the Mexican-
American War, took place on foreign ground. What little fighting there was in the U.S. occurred in sparsely
populated areas. I have thus found no records of potential violations of the Third Amendment during the
Mexican-American War.
During World'War I, Congress came quite close to authorizing the quartering of troops without
explicitly mentioning the Third Amendment. It authorized the Secretary of War "to requisition or otherwise
take over for the United States any lands, including the buildings thereon and their equipment, or any
temporary use thereof, required for hospital facilities." Act of Nov. 4, 1918, ch. 201, 40 Stat. 1020, 1029.
Congress also authorized the seizure of buildings and furnishings for housing shipyard employees, Act of
Mar. 1, 1918, ch. 19, 40 Stat. 438, 438, and workers in industries essential to the national defense, Act of
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To emphasize how the Third Amendment was ignored and abused in these conflicts,
this article will first consider the respect with which the states treated their quartering laws
during the War for Independence. As noted earlier, Delaware and Maryland had issued
declarations of rights stipulating that troops could be quartered only via legislatively
enacted processes.154 When faced with the need to quarter troops, the legislatures of
each of these states admitted that they were obligated to uphold their prior declarations
and passed acts to regulate quartering. 155 New Jersey,"5 6  Connecticut,' 57  New
York,' " and Pennsylvania'59 enacted similar legislation even though these states were
not bound by previous declarations of rights. Although the latter three states did little
more than give permission for troops to be quartered, the legislatures of Delaware,
Maryland, and New Jersey issued highly detailed quartering regulations. Generally
speaking, their statutes required that Justices of the Peace direct the quartering of troops;
that they try first to find rooms in hired housing, then in taverns and inns, then in empty
or abandoned houses, 6 ° and only then in private homes;' 6' that troops be distributed
evenly and fairly; that fines be paid by officials who quartered in violation of the statute
and by civilians who resisted lawful requests for shelter; and that those on whom troops
were quartered receive rent and recompense for property damage. The legislatures of
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey apparently took their duties to oversee quartering
quite seriously.
Congress has shown much less sensitivity to the requirements of the Third
Amendment. Consider its behavior during the War of 1812. Although it had officially
declared war against England, it did not lay down laws regulating the quartering of
troops.'62 Yet, troops were quartered in U.S. homes.'63
May 16, 1918, ch. 74, § 1, 40 Stat. 550, 550 (amended 1922). Each of these acts limited the grant of power
to the duration of the war and provided for just compensation.
'54 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
... An ACT for the Quartering of Soldiers Passed at Session Beginning January, 1779, Acts of the
General Assembly of the Delaware State 7 (Adams); An ACT for quartering Soldiers Passed at Session
Beginning Feb. 5, 1777, Chap. XIV, I Laws of Maryland (Maxcy 1811), reprinted in EMERGENCY
LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR TO DECEMBER, 1917, DEALING WITH THE CONTROL AND TAKING OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE, BENEFIT, OR WELFARE, at 290 (J. Reuban Clark ed., 1918) [hereinafter
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR TO DECEMBER, 1917].
156 New Jersey's legislators explained they were fulfilling their state's constitutional requirement to
follow common law. An ACT for the better regulating the Quartering of Soldiers, etc., passed at Session
Beginning Oct. 28, 1777, Chap. XV, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey 35, 35
(Collins).
"' An Act enabling the Civil Authority and Select-men in the several Towns within this State, to appoint
Barrack-Masters within said Towns, 1778 Conn. Pub. Acts 482.
58 AN ACT for regulating impresses of forage and carriages and for billeting troops within this State, Ch.
29, I Laws of the State of New York 55 (Weed, Parsons & Co.).
159 AN ACT TO MAKE MORE EFFECTUAL PROVISION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THIS STATE, Ch. CML, § V,
10 Pa. Stat. 361 (Mitchell & Flanders).
6 The Delaware statute placed empty or abandoned houses before taverns and inns. An ACT for the
Quartering of Soldiers Passed at Session Beginning January, 1779, Acts of the General Assembly of the
Delaware State at 8 (Adams).
161 The Maryland statute stipulated that troops be quartered in the houses of those "who shall hereafter
be adjudged Enemies or disaffected Persons by any legal Authority of this State" before they be quartered in
any other house. ACT for quartering Soldiers Passed at Session Beginning Feb. 5, 1777, Chap. XIV, § II, I
Laws of Maryland (Maxcy) reprinted in EMERGENCY LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR TO DECEMBER, 1917,
supra note 155, at 290-301.
.62 From a search of the United States Statutes at Large, vol. 1-3.
After the fact, however, Congress offered to compensate any person who had "sustained damage by the
destruction of his or her house or building by the enemy, while the same was occupied as a military deposite
[sic], under the authority of an officer or agent of the United States. Act of April 9, 1816, ch. 40, § 9, 3 Stat.
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The Civil War ushered in another plague of forced quartering. 6" An account given
of the Union's invasion of Virginia's Eastern Shore indicates its prevalence.'65 The
Union's occupying force "was better received and more friendly to most of their captors"
than any other during the war.'66 Yet even here the Army quartered troops on local
civilians.'67 One might follow Texas v. White in arguing that the citizens of Virginia and
the other rebel states did not deserve the Third Amendment's protections.' 68 The
Supreme Court held that "during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State as a
member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were suspended.' ' 169 This is a
controversial claim. 7° Even if we accept it, however, it does nothing to excuse the
quartering of troops on the citizens of loyal states. Apparently, however, such quartering
did take place. Not only are there specific reports of troops having been quartered in
Union territory,' 7' but the Secretary of War alluded to having seized the homes of loyal
citizens to use as barracks.'72 The practice grew so common that the military developed
a sophisticated system for reviewing claims "for rent for houses... seized and occupied
by the military authorities in loyal States during the rebellion."' 73
How much quartering did Union citizens endure? The Committee on War-Claims
estimated that $500,000 in claims for rent and damage to real estate came from loyal
states following the Civil War ($2,500,000 in like claims came from rebel states). 174
This is but a portion of the actual damages, for many of these claims were test-cases
designed to determine Congress' willingness to pay for such claims. The Committee
261, 263, amended by Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 110, § 1, 3 Stat. 397, 397 (explaining that the prior act
applied only to those places that had been used "as a place of deposit for military or naval stores, or as
barracks .... ).
163 Evidence of such quartering exists in the many private acts passed to provide compensation as
required by the Act of April 9, 1816, 3 Stat. 261. For an extensive listing of such acts, see REFERENCES TO
ACTS AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT FOR PROPERTY LOST, CAPTURED, OR DESTROYED BY THE ENEMY WHILE
IN THE MILITARY SERVICE, ETC. (1914). One example is an Act of April 17, 1822 "to pay John Anderson,
of Michigan, $1,300 for his house destroyed by fire in 1813 while occupied by United States troops without
his consent." Id. at 5.
64 This fact appears to have been overlooked by prior researchers on the Third Amendment. Fields &
Hardy, for example, merely find it "interesting to note that the Civil War produced no cases interpreting the
Third Amendment, even though it involved the domestic presence of large numbers of soldiers." Fields &
Hardy, supra note 2, at 394 n.4. See also Fields, supra note 2, at 204-05 n.83.
'65 Crowson, The Expedition of Henry Lockwood to Accomac, 36 WEST VIRGINIA HISTORY 202-12
(1984).
'66 Id. at 209.
167 Id. at 208, 210.
168 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1896).
169 Id. at 727. It is not clear that this applies to the counties of Virginia's Eastern Shore, however, as
Lincoln declared them to be loyal in November of 1862. Crowson, supra note 165, at 211.
70 Consider that the Court also held that "the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be
citizens of the Union." White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 726.
171 See, e.g., reference to an instance of quartering in Kentucky, described as "one of the numerous cases
of hardships occurring all over the border States during the war." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3074
(1868)(statement of Rep. Willey). See also COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS, S. REP. NO. 138, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1868) (petitioner Jerome J. Getty of Steams County, MN complaining that Union troops occupied his house
and bumt it to the ground). See also the account of quartering in Maryland that Hon. John Ritchie gave to
the House of Representatives in CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2406 (1872) (statement of Rep. Ritchie).
Troops were even quartered in the homes of citizens of Washington, D.C. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 3950 (1866) (statement of Rep. Anthony).
172 Letter from William W. Belknap, Secretary of War, to Hon. William Lawrence, Chairman of
Committee on War-Claims (February 24, 1874) [hereinafter Letter from Belknap], in COMMITTEE ON WAR-
CLAIMS, WAR-CLAIMS AND CLAIMS OF ALIENS, H.R. REP. NO. 262, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., at 73-74 (1874).
' Id. at 74.
174 Id. at 64 n.130.
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estimated that "very many millions" of further such claims would surface if Congress
offered compensation for rent and damage to real estate.'
75 It declined to do so. 76
One way or another, quartering Union troops in loyal states probably offended the
Third Amendment. The question, however, is how it did so. As long as it remains unclear
whether there existed a state of war sufficient to trigger the Third Amendment's second
clause, one cannot be sure which part of the Third Amendment such quartering violated.
Congress never officially declared war against the Confederate States. It regarded the
conflict as a response to insurrection rather than the conquest of a sovereign nation. We
might therefore conclude that the Civil War was a time of peace so far as it concerns the
Third Amendment. If so, then quartering Union troops in loyal states violated the first
clause of the Third Amendment: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner.' 177 On the other hand, one might agree with
the Committee on War-Claims that the insurrection had created a de facto state of war
giving the U.S. government "the same rights and powers which they might exercise in
the case of a national or foreign war."' 8 If so, then the second clause of the Third
Amendment would come into play, allowing wartime quartering "in a manner to be
prescribed by law.' ' 179 But quartering Union troops in loyal states violated this part of
the Third Amendment, too; Congress, the sole federal body with constitutional authority
to write laws,5 ° had neither authorized nor regulated such measures."'
'71 Id. at 65 n.130. The committee estimated that merely one class of these hidden claims would call for
compensation of $300,000. Id.
176 Congress initially denied remedy in the Court of Claims for all claims against the United States for
the destruction or appropriation of property during the suppression of the rebellion. Act of July 4, 1864, ch.
240, § 1, 13 Stat. 381. Congress relented many years later, allowing citizens who had remained loyal to the
Union to bring claims for "stores or supplies" seized by Union troops. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 116, § 2,
16 Stat. 521, 524 (repealed 1879). Even this concession failed to aid those on whom troops had been
quartered, however, for the Commissioners of Claims held that claims for rent or damage to property were
not included within the scope of the statute. U.S. COMMISSIONERS OF CLAIMS, 5TH GENERAL REPORT, 44th
Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1876).
Many of these claims for rent and damage to real estate undoubtedly arose from causes other than
troops being lodged in private houses. Some may also have come from homeowners seeking rent promised
them in consensual agreements. It seems safe to conclude, however, that a significant proportion of these
claims arose from the forced quartering of troops.
'7 U.S. CONST. amend. III, cl, 1.
78 COMMITTEE ON WAR-CLAIMS, WAR-CLAIMS AND CLAIMS OF ALIENS, supra note 172, at 4, quoting
the headnotes of the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 636, 636 (1862). The actual holding of the Prize Cases
appears to be somewhat more narrow. It extended the laws of war only to relations with neutral vessels
caught in a naval blockade-not to relations with loyal citizens holding constitutionally protected rights. 67
U.S. (2 Black) at 666.
179 U.S. CONST. amend. III, cl. 2.
8 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
'8' A search through the U.S. Statutes at Large from 1860 to 1865 reveals that Congressional concern
about the quartering of troops extended only as far as providing funds for the "hire or commutation of
quarters for officers on military duty, [and the] hire of quarters for troops ... " Act of June 21, 1860, ch,
163, § I, 12 Stat. 64, 65 (repealed 1933). Nearly identical wording appears in Army appropriation acts
throughout the Civil War period. See Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 72, § 1, 12 Stat. 200, 201; Act of July 5,
1862, ch. 133, § I, 12 Stat. 505, 507; Act of February 9, 1863, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 642, 644; Act of June
15, 1864, ch. 72, § 1, 13 Stat. 126, 128; Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 25, § 1, 13 Stat. 495, 496. Congress
apparently provided such funds only for leasing quarters in the conventional fashion, not for compensating
those on whom troops had been forced. See supra note 176.
Congressional authorization for the quartering of troops also fails to appear among the statutes
compiled in EMERGENCY LEGISLATION PASSED PRIOR TO DECEMBER, 1917, supra note 155.
The Secretary of Defense apparently viewed quartering as a form of taking allowed by the Fifth
Amendment. He justified the military's policy of paying rent for houses seized and occupied in loyal states as
just compensation. Letter from Belknap, supra note 172, at 74. He admitted that there was "no specific
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There appears to be only one way to avoid the conclusion that Union forces
repeatedly and openly violated the Third Amendment in the course of the Civil War: by
reading the Third Amendment to leave a gap between peace and war wide enough for the
Executive to order the quartering of troops during times of unrest. This article has already
considered the possibility that the select committee favored this interpretation of the Third
Amendment. s2 Quartering practices during the Civil War support this hypothesis by
vindicating the committee's expectations and legitimizing the Union's policies. Otherwise
the most charitable excuse for quartering practices under the Third Amendment would
blame them on mere ignorance of the law.' 83 This explanation finds support in the
absence of any record that victims of quartering sued to protect their Third Amendment
rights and in the fact that none of the federal documents referred to in this section make
even passing reference to the Third Amendment. Charitable though the ignorance alibi
may be, it still paints an unattractive picture of U.S. citizens, attorneys, and public
servants disregarding an entire portion of the Bill of Rights.
B. The Third Amendment in Litigation
The Third Amendment is the least litigated provision of the Bill of Rights. The
Supreme Court has never given it more than a passing reference, and no case has ever
grappled head-on with its apparent concern: the quartering of troops in civilian homes. For
the most part, the Third Amendment has played the role of a non-speaking extra on the
judicial stage. It has enjoyed but one brief moment in the spotlight: Engblom v.
Carey. 4 Consequently, this case serves as the major, if not only, judicial interpretation
of the Third Amendment.
1. Obscurity and Ridicule
That the Third Amendment has received scant recognition may be to its benefit,
considering the sort of attention that it has sometimes received. The first judicial
references to it were harmless, if uninspiring. They came only in Supreme Court dissents,
and in each case, the Third Amendment received no more than a passing reference as one
of several constitutionally protected rights.'85 More recently, the dissent in Poe v.
statutory authority" for this policy, id., but defended it on three grounds. First, he pointed to an act authorizing
him to "fix and make reasonable allowance for the store rent, [and] storage..." necessary for the safe
keeping of all military stores and supplies. Act of March 3, 1812, ch. 513, § 5, 2 Stat. 816, 817. (Note that it
does not refer to housing troops.) Second, he found support in art. 42 of the Revised Regulations of the Army,
August 11, 1861, approved by the President (not Congress). Letter from Belknap, supra note 172, at 74.
Finally, the Secretary of Defense explained that "it is believed that the practice of the War Department in this
regard is well known to Congress, and thus far it has met with no mark of disapproval." Id. None of these
justifications does much to establish that the Secretary quartered troops in a manner "prescribed by law."
182 See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
183 Apparently suspecting that the Civil War may indeed have seen troops quartered in violation of the
Third Amendment, Fields explains the absence of litigation to "the exigencies of war, the enhanced
authority of the military, and the sensibilities of the era .... Fields, supra note 2, at 205 n.83. But the
number of pleas for recompense brought before the Committee on War-Claims demonstrates that many
citizens did not surrender to military demands without a struggle.
84 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
18 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[S]uppose a State should
prohibit the free exercise of religion... or authorize soldiers in time of peace to be quartered in any house
without the consent of the owner.., or inflict cruel and unusual punishment."). See also, Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. 1 (1848) (Woodbury, J., dissenting); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1920) (McKenna, J., White, Ch.
J., et al., dissenting).
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Ullman employed the Third Amendment in this same manner. 8 6 Poe laid the ground-
work for the Third Amendment's most well-known Supreme Court appearance in
Griswold v. Connecticut.8 7 In that case the Third Amendment appeared as one of many
amendments demonstrating a constitutional right to privacy, a role the Third Amendment
has since played often. 8  Lower federal courts have likewise ensconced the Third
Amendment in string cites with other amendments.
89
Less frequently, courts have pointed to the Third Amendment as proof that the
Constitution carefully distinguishes between times of war and peace. The Supreme Court
cited the Third Amendment in this context in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.'9 Courts have similarly referred to the Third Amendment in order to emphasize
that the Constitution limits the role of the military in civilian affairs.' 9' The Third
Amendment has also served as a prop in judicial expositions on constitutional interpreta-
tion, in one case demonstrating how certain freedoms have "faded into relative
inconsequentiality."' 1
92
The Third Amendment has also acted like a magnet for somewhat less sensible uses.
Perhaps its relative anonymity invites mistreatment; that would explain why the court in
Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co. cited it as supporting the right to a
civil jury trial, presumably intending to refer to the Seventh Amendment.'9 3 At other
times plaintiffs have used the Third Amendment in support of far-fetched, metaphorical
applications. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Executive Securities Corp. grew out
of a claim that the use of a subpoena violated the Third Amendment.'94 Army reservists
816 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Can there be any doubt that a Bill of Rights that
in time of peace bars soldiers from being quartered in a home 'without the consent of the Owner' should bar
the police from investigating the intimacies of the marriage relation?") See also Lombard v. State of
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 274 (Douglas, J., concurring).
187 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
88 [S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.... Various guaran-
tees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
id. at 484
89 See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 44 F.2d 967 (D.N.J. 1930), rev'd on other ground; Wallace v.
Ford, 21 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Tex. 1937).
'90 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952). The Third Amendment has played a similar role in other federal courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Rappepon, 36 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff d sub nom United States v.
Herling, 120 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1941); United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40 (1942), affd, 320 U.S. 115
(1943).
... See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 22 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Laird is the Third
Amendment's only Supreme Court appearance since Youngstown in which it has not been used in support of
a right to privacy. The Third Amendment also demonstrates the military's limited role in civilian affairs in
United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 375 (4th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974), and
Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985).
192 Mitman v. Glascott, 557 F. Supp. 429, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In American Jewish Congress v. City of
Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 139 (7th Cir. 1987), Judge Easterbrook used the Third Amendment to distinguish
between a "rule" (like the Third Amendment) and a "standard" (like the First Amendment).
193 Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 Fed. 107 (N.D. I11. 1918). The Seventh
Amendment provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall not exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexam-
ined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend
VII.
94 Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Executive Securities Corp., 433 F. Supp. 470, 473 n.2'
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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ordered to march in a parade appealed to a supposed Third Amendment right to sit it out
in Jones v. United States Secretary of Defense.'95 The defendant in United States v.
Valenzuela alleged that "[t]he 1947 House and Rent Act... is and always was the
incubator and hatchery of swarms of bureaucrats to be quartered as storm troopers upon
the people in violation of Amendment III. 96 The courts summarily rejected the
Third Amendment claims in each of these cases.
Though the legal community has sometimes given the Third Amendment short shrift,
the popular press has subjected it to outright ridicule. Prof. M. E. Shugee, for example,
has presented a unique interpretation of the Third Amendment's prohibitions on quartering
troops: " 'The amendment actually means that no soldier shall be cut into four parts in
a person's house unless the owner agrees.' -197 Dave Barry, on the other hand, has
questioned the need for the Third Amendment's protection on other grounds:
[T]here are times when I wouldn't mind having soldiers lodged in my home,
such as the other day when my wife told me the lawn-sprinkler valve was
leaking, and I went outside to check it out, in my role as a Guy Fixing a
Mechanical Problem, and suddenly-this is the truth-a totally unanticipated
snake stuck its head out of the valve, and I was forced to switch over to my
role of a Guy With No Pulse Backing Away From a Valve. If there had
been soldiers lodging in my home, they could have dealt with this situation
calmly and professionally by shooting the snake into 30,000 pieces...9'
Disrespectful though it may be, such humor actually bears witness to the success of the
Third Amendment's silent vigil. Few people would giggle about the Third Amendment
if they had to tiptoe around slumbering G.I.s on the way to breakfast each morning.
2. Engblom v. Carey
Engblom v. Carey was the first case to subject the Third Amendment's restrictions
on quartering to judicial interpretation.' 99 It presented the question of whether New York
State violated the Third Amendment by quartering National Guard troops in the on-site
residences of striking correctional officers. 2°° The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that there were sufficient questions of fact regarding the officers' possessory interests in
their residences to raise the issue of whether or not their Third Amendment rights had
been infringed. 20 ' The court's findings had a powerful impact on the scope of liability
under the Third Amendment, but because the defendants ultimately prevailed, the court
did not decide how to remedy violations of the Third Amendment.2 2
9 346 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn. 1972).
'96 United States v. Valenzuala, 95 F. Supp. 363, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
'9 M.E. Shugee, Constitutional Right to Bear Arms: Bombs Away, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 1984, at 14.
198 Dave Barry, Snakes and the Constitution, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 7, 1987, at Fl.
'99 Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982). For an analysis of Engblom see Comment, supra
note 3, at 857-70. Only one other case, Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp 1236 (D.D.C.
1983), presented as promising a set of facts for Third Amendment litigation. The plaintiff in Ramirez de
Arellano complained that U.S. troops had set up a regional military training center on his Honduras ranch.
Id. at 1238. The case never gave the Third Amendment more than passing mention, however, instead
winding through the U.S. court system in pursuit of other issues.
200 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 961.
201 Id. at 964.
202 See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
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The correctional officers' dorm-style residences were owned by the State of New
York and located on the grounds of the Mid-Orange Correctional Facility for its
employees to use at their option. Documents governing the use of the residences
explicitly specified that the state and the occupant officers held a normal landlord-tenant
relation. On April 18, 1979, correctional officers at Mid-Orange joined in a state-wide
strike called by the AFL-CIO. In response, Governor Hugh L. Carey activated the
National Guard. The Mid-Orange superintendent locked the plaintiff officers out of the
facility grounds and, as a consequence, out of their on-site residences. The state housed
National Guard troops in the officers' rooms during the strike. The plaintiff officers
alleged that upon their return they found their rooms ransacked and their personal
property destroyed or missing203
Based on these facts, the plaintiffs asserted that the State of New York had violated
their Third Amendment rights by quartering troops in their homes during peacetime.2 °
The district court granted the state summary judgment on the claim, finding that the
plaintiffs lacked a sufficient possessory interest in their residences to qualify for the Third
Amendment's protections.0 5 The court of appeals reversed and remanded on this
count.2 °6 In the process, the Engblom court came to three findings that have important,
if unexamined, consequences for future litigation of the Third Amendment.
Two of these three findings have particular importance to the states' approach to
quartering. In the first place, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court that National
Guard troops are "soldiers" within the meaning of the Third Amendment.2 7 In the
second place, the Engblom court explicitly extended the Third Amendment to the states
by incorporating it into the Fourteenth amendment.2"8 The Engblom court's third finding
with respect to the Third Amendment has more general import. Referring to the Supreme
Court's use of the Third Amendment in Griswold, the court in Engblom maintained that
"The Third Amendment was designed to assure a fundamental right to privacy.''29 The
Supreme Court has rejected rigid definitions of "ownership" when applying the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable search and seizure.21 Engblom applied
a similar analysis to the Third Amendment, holding that "property-based privacy interests
protected by the Third Amendment ... extend to those recognized and permitted by society
as founded on lawful occupation or possession with a legal right to exclude others." ''
After Engblom, then, the Third Amendment applies to owners of leaseholds as well as to
owners in fee simple.
203 Id. at 960.
204 Id. at 961.
20' Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
206 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 963.
207 Id. at 961. Although the court went no further than this in defining the term, the Supreme Court has
found that "soldier" embraces non-commissioned officers, musicians, artificers, privates, and "other enlisted
men." Hartigan v. United States, 196 U.S. 169, 173 (1905). "Soldier" has also been held to include officers
generally, Lamb v. Kroeger, 8 N.W.2d 405, 406 (Iowa 1943), and persons enlisted in the Navy, Macon v.
Samples, 145 S.E. 57, 61 (Ga. 1928), while excluding field clerks, Stephens v. Civil Service Comm'n of
New Jersey, 127 A. 808, 809 (N.J. 1925). Ironically, though, one might say that officially there are no
soldiers in the U.S. armed forces, as the term does not appear among the applicable statutory definitions. See
10 U.S.C. §101 (1988).
200 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 961. By citing it in support of a right to privacy, several Supreme Court cases
have apparently assumed the incorporation of the Third Amendment: see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 549 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
209 Engblom, 677 F. 2d at 962.
2"0 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
21' Engblom, 677 F. 2d at 962.
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C. State Constitutions and Quartering
By extending the reach of the federal constitution's Third Amendment, Engblom
significantly reduced the practical importance of states' constitutional protections from the
quartering of troops. To fully understand Engblom's impact, this article will first examine
the wide variety of quartering amendments that states have placed in their constitutions.
A majority of the states' constitutions-thirty-three in all-include a quartering
amendment nearly identical to the U.S. Constitution's Third Amendment." 2 Other
quartering amendments vary only slightly from the Third Amendment. Delaware's
quartering amendment, for example, stipulates that civil magistrates must carry out the
legislature's requirements for wartime quartering.2"3 The constitutions of Massachusetts
and New Hampshire likewise call for the involvement of civil authorities, in addition
specifying that quartering shall be done in a manner ordained "by the legislature," rather
than "by law.
' 2 14
Seven state constitutions fail to even mention quartering, and one may well wonder
why the other forty-three concern themselves with the topic.2"5 After all, states can
scarcely purport to command the billeting of federal troops. But states can claim authority
over their National Guards. The courts have traditionally considered National Guard troops
to be state employees unless they are called into federal service.21 6 Engblom v. Carey
reaffirmed this view.2"7 The states' quartering amendments thus protect their residents
from the forced billeting of National Guard troops. Engblom explicitly extended the Third
Amendment to the states by incorporating it into the Fourteenth Amendment and held that
National Guard troops are "soldiers" within the meaning of the Third Amendment." 8
As a consequence, no state can take a more permissive approach to quartering than the
212 Most state quartering amendments differ from the Third Amendment only in matters of punctuation
or capitalization, if at all. Connecticut's constitution, for example, stipulates that "No soldier shall, in time
of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner
to be prescribed by law." CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17. California captures the substance of the Third
Amendment in a somewhat more different form: "Soldiers may not be quartered in any house in wartime
except as prescribed by law, or in peacetime without the owner's consent." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 5. The
Confederate Constitution copied the Third Amendment verbatim. C.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 14.
3 "No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in
time of war but by a civil magistrate, in manner to be prescribed by law." DEL. CONST. art. I, § 18.
This is the sort of quartering amendment suggested by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts in House
debate over the Bill of Rights. I ANNALS OF CONG. 752 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1789).
214 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 27 ("In time of peace, no soldier ought to be quartered in any house without
the consent of the owner; and in time of war, such quarters ought not to be made but by the civil magistrate,
in a manner ordained by the legislature.") N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 27 ("No soldier in time of peace, shall be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner; and in time of war, such quarters ought not to be
made but by the civil authorities in a manner ordained by the legislature.").
21" These seven constitutions belong to Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, Mississippi, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Each of these constitutions have other clauses, however, from which one could patch together
protections similar to those put forward in the Third Amendment. Virginia's constitution, for example,
emphasizes that "in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, civil
power." VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
26 See Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1965) (each state's governor
commands its guard except when it is called into federal service), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 159
(1965); Gnagy v. United States, 634 F.2d 574, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("a National Guard unit not in active
federal service is a state organization, rather than a federal organization"); Mela v. Callaway, 378 F. Supp.
25, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
217 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 961.
21' Id. See supra note 208.
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Third Amendment permits, even with regard to National Guard troops.219 State
quartering amendments still serve a purpose, however, insofar as they offer their residents
greater protections from the billeting of National Guard troops than the Third Amendment
requires.
With two exceptions, that seems to be the aim of the eight remaining state
constitutions. The first exception appears in the constitution of Texas, which protects only
citizens from the abuses of quartering.220 If Texas officials treated this as an invitation
to quarter their National Guard on non-citizen homeowners during times of war, they
would do so in violation of the Third Amendment."' The second exception appears in
the constitution of Kansas, which shelters only occupants from billeting.22 If Kansas
officials tried to quarter National Guard troops in an unoccupied house, its owner could
justly appeal to the Third Amendment's guarantees.
The final six state constitutions present some interesting variations on the quartering
amendment theme, all apparently attempting to offer stronger protections than does the
Third Amendment. The constitutions of five of them-Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine,
and Michigan-extend their protections to occupants as well as owners. 223 Unless these
states intend to protect even illegal occupants from peacetime quartering, however, their
generosity has little effect. Engblom has effectively preempted such measures by
extending Third Amendment rights to anyone who holds the legal right to exclude others
from a home.224 Only the quartering amendments in the constitutions of Arkansas and
Louisiana can claim to have a broader reach than the Third Amendment. Arkansas's
quartering amendment shelters not only the home, but all of an owner's real property.
2 25
Given that it emphasizes privacy rights rather than property rights, Engblom would
probably not give the Third Amendment this broad a reach. Louisiana goes still further
beyond the limits of Engblom's Third Amendment. Its constitution provides that: "No
person shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner or lawful
occupant. ' 226 This is the strongest guarantee against quartering in any U.S. federal or
state constitution. Louisiana's quartering amendment forbids quartering anyone (soldiers
or otherwise) on anybody (owners or occupants) at anytime (war or peace).
219 At present, only the Constitutions of Texas and Kansas threaten to do so. See infra notes 220-22 and
accompanying text.
220 "No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in the house of any citizen without the consent of the
owner, nor in time of war but in a manner prescribed by law." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 25 (emphasis added).
221 It is not clear whether the Texas quartering provision refers to Texas citizens or U.S. citizens. If the
former, it probably violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. If the latter, it
probably violates the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
222 "No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the occupant,
nor in time of war, except as prescribed by law." KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 14 (emphasis added).
223 See, for example, Maine's quartering amendment: "No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner or occupant, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." ME. CONST. art. I, § 18 (emphasis added).
Hawaii and Alaska forbid more than just soldiers from quartering. Hawaii's quartering amendment
applies to any "soldier or member of the militia." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 18. Alaska's applies to any
"member of the armed forces." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 20. These modifications are probably not enough to
give residents of Hawaii and Alaska greater protections than they would enjoy under Engblom, however, for
courts would probably prevent the quartering of National Guard cooks just as readily as they would National
Guard troops.
224 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 962.
225 "[N]o soldier shall be quartered in any house, or on any premises, without the consent of the owner
in time of peace; nor in time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law." ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 27
(emphasis added).
226 LA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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Unfortunately, we can only speculate about the impact that the variations among the
states' quartering amendments would actually have in practice. To date, no state restriction
on quartering has undergone the acid test of litigation.227
D. Quartering as Taking
Regardless of Engblom's powerful effects on Third Amendment theory, it failed to
specify the remedies available to victims of quartering. 'Equitable remedies were
inappropriate under the facts of the case, and the court neglected to set forth guidelines
for monetary damages.22 Nor was the matter settled on remand, where the defending
state officials prevailed. 229 In any event, Engblom presents the easy case-it seems
certain that those who prevail on claims of illegal peacetime quartering will receive
something for their troubles.
Courts, however, must not treat peacetime quartering as merely another form of
taking. Unless they levy punitive damages or other penalties against those responsible for
this illegal and unconstitutional behavior, the Third Amendment's consent requirement
will offer no more protection from quartering than the Fifth Amendment's takings
clause.22 ' For this reason, courts must also guard against the military circumventing the
Third Amendment by formally condemning homes in peacetime for use as barracks. 23'
The military could make a plausible claim to possess such power under current
statutes. 232
More difficult questions arise with regard to the remedies available to victims of
quartering imposed legally during wartime. These victims would certainly seem to deserve
recompense for having temporarily sacrificed their homes. They will probably have also
suffered damage to their real and personal property. How will they find relief?. The Fifth
Amendment's takings clause seems to offer a means for the victims of wartime quartering
to seek relief.233 But before they can lay claim to the just compensation that it would
provide, they must satisfy two questions. Does quartering constitute an instance of taking
227 From a WESTLAW and hardcopy search of annotated state constitutions, July 20, 1991.
228 Engblom, 677 F. 2d 957. An equitable remedy would have come too late to stop the quartering,
which had already begun and ended. Nor would an equitable remedy have helped the plaintiffs to recover
their residences, because they had already been offered housing at the facility following the strike's
conclusion. Id. at 961. Because facts similar to these are present in most cases of quartering, victims of -
quartering will generally find equitable relief of little use-unless they can obtain it quickly enough to oust
troops from their homes.
229 They won on an affirmative defense of "good faith" immunity. Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). In effect, the Third Amendment's obscurity came to their rescue, for the absence of judicial
interpretation on the topic meant that "plaintiffs' Third Amendment rights were not 'clearly established' at
the time of the events in question." Id. at 49.
230 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
231 Although quartering puts troops and homeowners in the same building, this does not necessarily make
it any worse than condemnation. To the contrary, victims of quartering enjoy an advantage: they can live
elsewhere while troops occupy their homes and return later to resume possession.
With regard to quartering during times of war, courts should have the opposite concern: that the
military will favor quartering over compensation in an attempt to escape the duty to pay compensation.
232 A Secretary of a military department may "acquire by condemnation any interest in land, including
temporary use, needed for-(I) the site, construction, or operation of fortifications, coast defenses, or military
training camps .... 10 U.S.C. § 2663(a) (1988).
233 The seizure of private property for military purposes must meet the same standards of just compensa-
tion that apply to other takings for public use. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
U.S. 1 (1949).
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private property for public use? If so, do any intervening doctrines prevent the Fifth
Amendment from applying to the quartering of troops?
Homeowners can take advantage of the Fifth Amendment's protections only if
quartering qualifies as a form of taking. There can be little doubt that it involves private
property-lest we miss the point, the Third Amendment capitalizes "Owner." Nor does
there seem to be much doubt that wartime quartering serves a public end. The only real
point of contention is whether or not quartering would qualify as a form of taking. If
quartering is a form of taking, it must be a particularly limited kind. Sometimes only a
portion of a home may be needed to provide a soldier or soldiers with lodging. Also,
billeted troops do not become permanent guests; unless the war never ends, quartering will
be only a temporary taking at the most.
Taken separately, these limits on the space and time of quartering's intrusions do not
appear to exempt it from the Fifth Amendment. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp. the Supreme Court held that even an intrusion as small as that inflicted by
an unwelcome video cable could constitute a taking of private property.234 On the other
hand, the wartime taking cases firmly establish that a temporary invasion of property
constitutes a taking no less than a permanent one.2 35 But does the Fifth Amendment
apply even when these space and time limitations occur in the same taking? Penn Central
Transportation Company v. City of New York set forth the various criteria that courts
should weigh in determining if the government has a duty to compensate takings of a very
limited nature.236 Courts should ask whether the putative taking "can be characterized
as a physical invasion," '237 whether it conflicts with interests that are "sufficiently
bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for
Fifth Amendment purposes, ' and whether it interferes "with distinct investment-
backed expectations."'239 Quartering qualifies as a form of taking on all three counts.
Absent intervening doctrines, then, the Fifth Amendment should guarantee that those
who suffer quartering receive just compensation for their losses. In practice, that is how
Union military officials regarded quartering during the Civil War. They paid "rent for
houses... seized and occupied by the military authorities in loyal States" because they
reasoned that they were bound to do so "by virtue of an implied contract, under the
[F]ifth [A]mendment of the Constitution. 2 40 Two theoretical arguments, however,
threaten this practical understanding of the relationship between the Third Amendment and
the Fifth Amendment. The first treats quartering as a special class of taking; the second
avoids compensation by appealing to "military necessity."
The Third Amendment makes no explicit provision for compensating homeowners
who have suffered quartering. It states only that quartering must be done, if at all, "in a
manner to be prescribed by law. ' 2 4 ' Does the "law" in this case include the Fifth
Amendment? It would certainly seem odd to hold that it does not, given that the
Constitution sets forth the highest law of the land. Suppose, however, that the Founders
meant to treat quartering as a special class of takings. In this case, the Third Amendment
would demand more and less than the Fifth Amendment. Unlike the Fifth Amendment,
234 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
235 See Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 372; General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 373; Kimball Laundry Co.,
338 U.S. at 1.
236 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
237 Id. at 124.
238 Id. at 125.
239 Id. at 124.
240 Letter from Belknap, supra note 172, at 74.
241 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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the Third Amendment would require that homeowners consent to quartering-type takings
in times of peace. On the other hand, the Third Amendment would undercut the Fifth
Amendment in times of war by allowing Congress to deny compensation to those on
whom troops had been quartered.242 The Founders may have felt that quartering at the
expense of homeowners would save funds better spent on uniforms and gunpowder, or
that the exigencies of war would leave little time for the niceties of just compensation.
Can we thus read the Third Amendment's silence with regard to compensation as an
implicit license to deny it? Here, at last, may be an unquestionably proper role for the
Ninth Amendment, which asserts that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 243 The
Fifth Amendment gives the people the right to just compensation if their private property
is seized for public use. Applying the Ninth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment to the
case at hand leads quite directly to one conclusion: the Third Amendment's enumeration
of a constitutional right to legal constraints on wartime quartering shall not be taken to
deny or disparage a homeowner's right to receive just compensation for a public taking.
Victims of quartering must cross yet another hurdle before they can appeal to the
Fifth Amendment, however: the argument of military necessity. In the face of hundreds
of thousands of dollars of potential claims arising out of the Civil War, the Committee
on War-Claims contended that
In battle or immediately after, and when it may be impossible to procure
property in any regular mode by contract or impressment, self-preservation
and humanity may require the temporary occupancy of houses for hospitals
for wounded soldiers, or for the shelter of troops, and for necessary military
operations which admit of neither choice nor delay.... 244
The Committee concluded that under these conditions instances of quartering constitute
acts which "arise from and are governed by the law of overruling military necessity-mere
accidents of war inevitably and unavoidably incidental to its operations-and which by
international law impose no obligations to make recompense. ' 245 President Grant
expressed a similar view in vetoing a bill for compensating one who had lost his home
to military necessity: "It is a general principle of both international and municipal law
that all property is held subject... to be temporarily occupied, or even actually destroyed,
in times of great public danger and when the public safety demands it....' '246 In these
cases, the President continued, "governments do not admit a legal obligation on their part
to compensate the owner."
247
The Committee of Claims (not to be confused with the Committee on War-Claims)
disagreed with the President: "The committee has not found any such general principle
affirmed either in international or municipal law, but has found the very reverse of that
to be affirmed by all law, international and municipal. ' 241 Whether or not this
242 This argument parallels the Supreme Court's holding in Hollingsworth v. Virginia that the veto clause
does not apply to an area about which it is silent, constitutional amendments. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
But note this crucial difference: the President's veto powers are not protected by the Ninth Amendment;
citizens' rights to just compensation are protected. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
243 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
244 COMMITTEE ON WAR-CLAIMS, WAR-CLAIMS AND CLAIMS OF ALIENS, supra note 171, at 40.
245 Id. But see Letter from Belknap, supra note 172, at 74 (recognizing a Fifth Amendment right to just
compensation for quartering).
246 S. EXEC. Doc. NO. 85, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1872) (veto of bill for relief of J. Milton Best).
247 id.
248 COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS, S. REP. NO. 412, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1873).
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overstated the case in 1873, today one must consider the Caltex decision, in which the
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply when U.S. forces seize and
destroy private property to prevent it from falling into the hands of a wartime enemy.24 9
Caltex, however, does not go so far as to excuse quartering without compensation. More
fundamentally, we should question whether international and municipal law apply to this
issue. The Committee on War-Claims justified appealing to them by citing Congress's
power "To define and punish... Offences against the Law of Nations."25 From this
the Committee argued that, being part of the law of nations, "The laws of war, equally
with the amendments to the Constitution, determine certain rights of person and
property ... But where war is actually flagrant, or a state of war and the exercise of
military authority exist, the laws of war prevail." 25 ' This argument proves too much,
however. It gives the President power to suspend the Fifth Amendment, and the rest of
the Bill of Rights, 252 wherever war-like conditions obtain-even if Congress has not
officially declared war and even if the President has initiated and encouraged the
emergency situation. The conflict need only be "actually flagrant. ' 253 But "[t]he
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all time, and
under all circumstances."
25 4
Several flaws thus weaken the arguments that would bar victims of wartime quartering
from appealing to the Fifth Amendment. Assume then that victims of quartering could sue
for just compensation. What would they get for their efforts? Generally speaking, victims
of quartering would deserve recompense for any lost value that they could have
exchanged on the market were it not for the government having seized their property,
including the rental value of their homes and the value of any property stolen or
destroyed.255 Courts will not, however, award damages for "loss to the owner of
nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic
attachment to it....,,256 It therefore does not appear that the victims of quartering could
recover for what may be their most grievous injuries: being forced onto the street, seeing
strangers occupy and ransack their houses, and homesickness.
IV. CONCLUSION
The threat of quartering that seemed so immediate to the Founders seems remote to
us now. But one should not therefore dismiss the Third Amendment as a charming relic
from more dangerous times. It can speak volumes-if one takes the time to listen. Tracing
249 United States v. Caltex (Philippines) Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
250 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
251 COMMITTEE ON WAR-CLAIMS, WAR-CLAIMS AND CLAIMS OF ALIENS, supra note 172, at 10-1 1
(emphasis in the original).
252 Thus the Third Amendment would also fall before the Committee's argument. But the Third
Amendment lays down provisions that apply specifically during times of war. The Founders apparently
assumed that the Bill of Rights would continue to define the law at such times.
253 Note that the Committee's argument does not even require that the President, much less Congress,
declare an area to be in rebellion for military necessity to obtain. It argued that no recompense was due to
citizens in portions of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. COMMITTEE ON
WAR-CLAIMS, WAR-CLAIMS AND CLAIMS OF ALIENS, supra note 172, at 11. President Lincoln never
proclaimed insurrections to exist in these states. Id. at 77-78.
254 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120-21 (1866). But see id. at 138 (Chase, C.J., concurring) (joined by
Wayne, Swayne, & Miller, J.J.) ("[T]he power of Congress, in the government of the land and naval forces
and of the militia, is not at all affected by the fifth or any other amendment.").
255 See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7-8.
256 Id. at 5.
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the Third Amendment's deep roots in English law reveals the origins of our legal heritage.
Its bloodline winds through early American history, outlining the causes of the Revolution
and culminating in the struggle to determine the final content of the Constitution's Bill
of Rights. Although the Third Amendment has seldom been litigated, it still raises
interesting theoretical questions about states' powers under federalism, rights to property
and privacy, and the interplay of overlapping constitutional protections.
Fortunately, the Third Amendment is not yet gone. Now perhaps it will not remain
forgotten. If the Third Amendment is forgotten, one can only hope will ever again need
its protection. In that case, complacency would merely demonstrate that the Third
Amendment works exactly as planned. But if memory fails and history repeats, one can
only hope that the troops will not stay long.
